9 dicembre forconi: 12/07/17

giovedì 7 dicembre 2017

UNA BOMBA ESPLODE A ROMA DAVANTI ALLA STAZIONE DEI CARABINIERI A SAN GIOVANNI

“ATTO DI TERRORISMO” 

IL CAPO DELLA POLIZIA FRANCO GABRIELLI: “EPISODIO GRAVISSIMO MA NESSUN ALLARMISMO” 

APERTA UN’INCHIESTA CONTRO IGNOTI


bomba roma carabinieri san giovanniBOMBA ROMA CARABINIERI SAN GIOVANNI
Un ordigno rudimentale è stato fatto esplodere stamattina, intorno alle 5.30, davanti al portone d'ingresso della stazione dei Carabinieri di Roma San Giovanni, in via Britannia 37.

Non ci sono stati feriti. Il generale Antonio de Vita, comandante provinciale dei carabinieri di Roma, appena informato dell'esplosione si è subito recato sul posto.

"Atto di terrorismo con ordigno esplosivo". Questo il reato per il quale procedono i magistrati della Procura di Roma del pool antiterrorismo, coordinati dal procuratore aggiunto Francesco Caporale.


Sono in corso indagini dei carabinieri del nucleo Informativo e del Nucleo Investigativo di Roma e ai Carabinieri del Ros per far luce sulla vicenda. La procura ha aperto un'inchiesta: al vaglio le immagini delle telecamere di sicurezza.

bomba roma carabinieri san giovanniBOMBA ROMA CARABINIERI SAN GIOVANNI
"E' un episodio gravissimo che ricondurrei pero' nelle dimensioni di quello che e' stato: non deve essere motivo di allarmismo". Ha commentato il capo della polizia, Franco Gabrielli. "Di filoni che ci indirizzano verso ipotetiche matrici ce ne sono quanti ne vogliamo", ha aggiunto a margine di un evento alla Fiera "Piu' libri, piu' liberi", che si tiene nel quartiere romano dell'Eur.

Mentre un falso allarme bomba è scattato questa mattina in piazza Risorgimento. L'area, all'angolo di via Porcari è stata chiusa poco dopo le 9 per permettere agli artificieri di verificare un pacco sospetto proprio a due passi dal Vaticano e dalla basilica di San Pietro. Tutte le verifiche hanno dato esito negativo e poco dopo la strada è stata riaperta al traffico

Fonte: qui

E LO STATO DOV’E’? - IL SINDACO DI CASAPESENNA, IL PAESE DEL BOSS DEI CASALESI MICHELE ZAGARIA, COSTRETTO A DIMETTERSI

L’UOMO, CHE DA TRE ANNI VIVE SOTTO SCORTA, HA DECISO DI LASCIARE DOPO CHE IL FRATELLO E’ STATO FERMATO DA TRE UOMINI ARMATI E INCAPPUCCIATI CHE…

Marcello De RosaMARCELLO DE ROSA

Casertano, sindaco lascia per minacce Marcello De Rosa (Pd), dal 2014 sindaco di Casape-senna (Caserta), il paese del boss dei Casalesi Michele Zagaria, si è dimesso. La decisione di De Rosa, che da tre anni vive sotto scorta per una rapina subita in casa, arriva qualche giorno dopo l' aggressione denunciata dal fratello Luigi: è stato fermato da tre uomini incappucciati e armati che lo hanno minacciato intimandogli di convincere Marcello a lasciare la carica. «Non ho paura del clan - ha detto quest' ultimo - ma non posso mettere in pericolo l' incolumità dei miei familiari».

5 Dicembre 2017

Fonte: qui

This Time Is Different, It Just Ends The Same

This past weekend, I was in Florida with Chris Martenson and Nomi Prins discussing the current backdrop of the markets, economic cycles, and future outcomes. A bulk of the conversations centered around the current “everything bubble” that currently exists globally. Elevated valuations in stock prices, extremely low yields between in “junk bonds,” or intense speculation around “cryptocurrencies” all suggest we have entered once again into “bubble” territory.”
Let me state this:
“Market bubbles have NOTHING to do with valuations or fundamentals.”
Hold on…don’t start screaming “heretic” and building gallows just yet. Let me explain.
Stock market bubbles are driven by speculation, greed, and emotional biases – therefore valuations and fundamentals are simply a reflection of those emotions.
In other words, bubbles can exist even at times when valuations and fundamentals might argue otherwise. Let me show you a very basic example of what I mean. The chart below is the long-term valuation of the S&P 500 going back to 1871.
First, it is important to notice that with the exception of only 1929, 2000 and 2007, every other major market crash occurred with valuations at levels LOWER than they are currently. Secondly, all of these crashes have been the result of things unrelated to valuation levels such as liquidity issues, government actions, monetary policy mistakes, recessions or inflationary spikes. However, those events were only a catalyst, or trigger, that started the “panic for the exits” by investors.
Market crashes are an “emotionally” driven imbalance in supply and demand. You will commonly hear that “for every buyer, there must be a seller.” This is absolutely true. The issue becomes at “what price.” What moves prices up and down, in a normal market environment, is the price level at which a buyer and seller complete a transaction.
In a market crash, however, the number of people wanting to “sell” vastly overwhelms the number of people willing to “buy.” It is at these moments that prices drop precipitously as “sellers” drop the levels at which they are willing to dump their shares in a desperate attempt to find a “buyer.” This has nothing to do with fundamentals. It is strictly an emotional panic which is ultimately reflected by a sharp devaluation in market fundamentals.
Bob Bronson once penned:
“It can be most reasonably assumed that market are sufficient enough that every bubble is significantly different than the previous one, and even all earlier bubbles. In fact, it’s to be expected that a new bubble will always be different than the previous one(s) since investors will only bid up prices to extreme overvaluation levels if they are sure it is not repeating what led to the last, or previous bubbles. Comparing the current extreme overvaluation to the dotcom is intellectually silly.

I would argue that when comparisons to previous bubbles become most popular – like now – it’s a reliable timing marker of the top in a current bubble. As an analogy, no matter how thoroughly a fatal car crash is studied, there will still be other fatal car crashes in the future, even if the previous accident-causing mistakes are avoided.”
He is absolutely right. Comparing the current market bubble to any previous market bubble is rather pointless. Financial markets have already studied and adapted to the causes of the previous “fatal crashes” but this won’t prevent the next one.
I previously discussed George Soros’ theory on bubbles which is worth reviewing at this juncture:
“First, financial markets, far from accurately reflecting all the available knowledge, always provide a distorted view of reality. The degree of distortion may vary from time to time. Sometimes it’s quite insignificant, at other times it is quite pronounced. When there is a significant divergence between market prices and the underlying reality the markets are far from equilibrium conditions.

Every bubble has two components:
  1. An underlying trend that prevails in reality, and; 
  2. A misconception relating to that trend.

When a positive feedback develops between the trend and the misconception, a boom-bust process is set in motion. The process is liable to be tested by negative feedback along the way, and if it is strong enough to survive these tests, both the trend and the misconception will be reinforced. Eventually, market expectations become so far removed from reality that people are forced to recognize that a misconception is involved. A twilight period ensues during which doubts grow, and more people lose faith, but the prevailing trend is sustained by inertia.

As Chuck Prince, former head of Citigroup, said, ‘As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We are still dancing.’ Eventually, a tipping point is reached when the trend is reversed; it then becomes self-reinforcing in the opposite direction.”
Typically bubbles have an asymmetric shape. The boom is long and slow to start. It accelerates gradually until it flattens out again during the twilight period. The bust is short and steep because it involves the forced liquidation of unsound positions.
The chart below is an example of asymmetric bubbles.
The pattern of bubbles is interesting because it changes the argument from a fundamental view to a technical view. Prices reflect the psychology of the market which can create a feedback loop between the markets and fundamentals.
This pattern of bubbles can be clearly seen at every bull market peak in history. The chart below utilizes Dr. Robert Shiller’s stock market data going back to 1900 on an inflation-adjusted basis with an overlay of the asymmetrical bubble shape.
There is currently a strong belief that the financial markets are not in a bubble. The arguments supporting those beliefs are all based on comparisons to past market bubbles.
The inherent problem with much of the mainstream analysis is that it assumes everything remains status quo. However, the question becomes what can go wrong for the market?
In a word, “much.”
Economic growth remains very elusive, corporate profits appear to have peaked, and there is an overwhelming complacency with regards to risk. Those ingredients combined with an extraction of liquidity by the Federal Reserve leaves the markets more vulnerable to an exogenous event than currently believed.
It is likely that in a world where there is virtually “no fear” of a market correction, an overwhelming sense of “urgency” to be invested and a continual drone of “bullish chatter;” markets are poised for the unexpected, unanticipated and inevitable reversion.
As Chris Martenson recently penned:
I hate to break it to you, but chances are you’re just not prepared for what’s coming.

These bubbles – blown by central bankers serially addicted to creating them (and then riding to the rescue to fix them) – are the largest in all of history. That means they’re going to be the most destructive in history when they finally let go.

Millions of households will lose trillions of dollars in net worth. Jobs will evaporate, causing the tens of millions of families living paycheck to paycheck serious harm.

These are the kind of painful consequences central bank follies result in. They’re particularly regrettable because they could have been completely avoided if only we’d taken our medicine during the last crisis back in 2008.  But we didn’t. We let the Federal Reserve –the institution largely responsible for creating the Great Financial Crisis — conspire with its brethren central banks to ‘paper over’ our problems.
So now we are at the apex of the most incredible nest of financial bubbles in all of human history.”
I am not trying to scare the “bejeebers” out of you, but he is right.
“All financial assets are just claims on real wealth, not actual wealth itself.  A pile of money has use and utility because you can buy stuff with it.  But real wealth is the “stuff” — food, clothes, land, oil, and so forth.  If you couldn’t buy anything with your money/stocks/bonds, their worth would revert to the value of the paper they’re printed on (if you’re lucky enough to hold an actual certificate). It’s that simple.

But trouble begins when the system gets seriously out of whack.

‘GDP’ is a measure of the number of goods and services available and financial asset prices represent the claims (it’s not a very accurate measure of real wealth, but it’s the best one we’ve got, so we’ll use it). Look at how divergent asset prices get from GDP as bubbles develop.
“What we see in the above chart is that the claims on the economy should, quite intuitively, track the economy itself.  Bubbles occurred whenever the claims on the economy, the so-called financial assets (stocks, bonds, and derivatives), get too far ahead of the economy itself.

This is a very important point. The claims on the economy are just that: claims.  They are not the economy itself!”
Take a step back from the media, and Wall Street commentary, for a moment and make an honest assessment of the financial markets today. If our job is to “bet” when the “odds” of winning are in our favor, then exactly how “strong” is the fundamental hand you are currently betting on?
This “time IS different” only from the standpoint that the variables are not exactly the same as they have been previously. Of course, they never are, and the result will be “…the same as it ever was.”

China: Systemic Risk Surges As HNA's High Coupon Borrowing Binge Accelerates

In early November 2017, we returned to one of our favourite subjects, systemic risk in China related to its big four highly-indebted conglomerates, HNA, Anbang, Evergrande and Dalian Wanda. In particular, we asked whether the extortionately high coupon of 9% on an HNA dollar bond issue, with less than one year to maturity, marked the beginning of China’s Minsky moment? As we noted at the time, HNA has $28 billion of short-term debt maturing before the end of June 2018, much of it accumulated during an acquisition binge over the last two years, which has seen it become a major shareholder in companies such as Deutsche Bank AG and Hilton Worldwide Holdings.
Speaking to Bloomberg at the time, Warut Promboon, managing partner at credit research firm, Bondcritic, noted...
“Nine percent is really high for one year. Basically, it tells you that the worry is real."
In a sign that HNA is under pressure, both from the Chinese government and its creditors, CEO Adam Tan announced last week that the company was reversing its previous strategy. From Reuters.
HNA Group CEO Adam Tan said the acquisitive company is making adjustments to conform with national policies, and has sold some investments and real estate projects to improve its liquidity, domestic media reported on Tuesday.

Tan said the company would not invest in those areas not backed by the government, while supporting Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative, the 21st Century Herald reported. “Companies cannot invest chaotically overseas, because chaotic investment creates trouble,” Tan was quoted in a separate article by the media portal Sina.com.
HNA is already in trouble, the question is how much? The group is planning an IPO of Gategroup Holding AG, an airline catering company it only purchased in 2016 for $1.5 billion, next year. However, its interest expenses have been rising rapidly and paying 9% coupons is only going to make it worse.
Meanwhile, it continues to tap bond markets at high rates, this time paying 8.2% for an issue by a subsidiary of Hainan Airlines, the core business from which HNA developed. According to Bloombergunits of HNA Group Co. are stepping up fundraising in the local bond market even as borrowing costs soar, adding to concerns about the Chinese conglomerate’s debt burden. Yunnan Lucky Air Co., a unit of Hainan Airlines Holding Co. -- HNA’s flag carrier -- sold a 270-day yuan bond to yield 8.2 percent last week, the highest coupon rate ever for the Yunnan airline. Tianjin Airlines Co., another subsidiary of Hainan Airlines, issued similar-maturity notes at the highest coupon rate in five years in November.
As Bloomberg notes, while other Chinese companies have cancelled bond issues, HNA doesn’t have that luxury.
While surging onshore bond yields last month forced Chinese companies to cancel the most bond offerings since April, HNA’s units didn’t slow their pace of financing. They revived debt sales from November, following a lull after news emerged in June about a crackdown by China’s banking regulator. The accelerated fundraising suggests a need for money and may hurt the conglomerate’s credit profile, according to credit research firm Bondcritic Ltd.
“They just keep piling on debt,” said Warut Promboon, managing partner at Bondcritic. “It’s not going to work.”

Two calls to Hainan Airlines’ public relations officers weren’t answered. There were no replies to questions sent via text messages.
The flood of issues from constituents of the HNA group is expected to continue, assuming that bond markets are amenable.
Hainan Airlines said last week that it is planning to sell 1 billion yuan of perpetual bonds on Dec. 6. That would be its third note sale in the local Chinese market in a month, according to Bloomberg-compiled data. In the carrier’s most recent sale of onshore securities last month, the company, which has top ratings from local credit assessors, issued local bonds at yields equivalent to junk notes in the nation.

Another HNA unit, Sanya Phoenix International Airport Co., is planning its third bond sale in three weeks on Monday, according to a statement on Nov. 29.
During his presentation last week, CEO Adam Tan commented that “Each of our business groups has its own cash flow management”. However, if Hainan Airlines is paying junk rates despite its “top” local ratings, it suggests that creditors are assessing risk from a group perspective…and unfavourably. Last week, Bloomberg noted that S&P cuts the HNA Group’s credit rating to five times below junk, citing its significant debt maturities, rising borrowing costs and proposed acquisition of New Zealand’s UDC Finance (will it ever learn).
S&P said on Wednesday it lowered HNA’s credit profile by one notch to b, or five levels below investment grade, from b+. The change was disclosed in a report by S&P on New Zealand’s UDC Finance Ltd., which HNA is seeking to buy.

“HNA Group has significant debt maturities over the next several years and its funding costs are meaningfully higher than that of a year ago," Andrew Mayes and Sharad Jain, analysts at S&P, wrote in their report. "We will closely monitor HNA Group’s access to capital markets and funding costs to determine whether additional actions are necessary.”

As to Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.’s UDC Finance, S&P said it may cut the company’s long-term debt rating by four notches to a junk level of BB- from BBB if its sale to HNA is completed. The deal, announced in January, has yet to be completed pending approval from New Zealand’s overseas investment approvals board.
It’s possible that HNA is approaching the “catastrophic margin call”, from its practice of pledging its own shares and those of its investments, which we first postulated in July 2017 in “A Reverse Rollup From Hell’: China's ‘Boldest Dealmaker’ Faces Margin Call Disintegration”. From our post.
…while most Chinese companies pledged "only" their own shares to get loans, a handful of companies also used shares of the acquired companies as pledged collateral. This is precisely what HNA Group did, which now faces not only growing regulatory scrutiny from Beijing that threatens to spook bond investors and raise HNA’s financing costs, but also send its shares plunging as holders are forced to liquidate even as most of the shares pledged to fund its buying spree are already declining, accelerating its demise. And, in a scenario that can only be dubbed as a "reverse rollup from hell" - on steroids and margin - one that would make even Valeant blush and snicker, if the value of its collateral, i.e. stock price, falls enough, HNA will soon be forced to sell its holdings to repay debt, thereby resulting in the disintegration of the company.
HNA is a private company, hence a detailed breakdown of its borrowing position and its share pledges is not available. However, the circumstantial evidence remains highly negative and the systemic risk it poses for China is likely rising not falling.
Fonte: qui