9 dicembre forconi: China
Visualizzazione post con etichetta China. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta China. Mostra tutti i post

domenica 2 dicembre 2018

For The First Time In 25 Years, China Has To Make A Choice Between External Stability And Growth

Back in August 2 we reported of a historic event for China's economyfor the first time in its modern history, China's current account balance for the first half of the year had turned into a deficit. And while the full year amount was likely set to revert back to a modest surplus, it was only a matter of time before one of the most unique features of China's economy - its chronic current account surplus - was gone for good.
Fast forward to this weekend, when as part of its summary of Top Macro Trades for 2019, UBS wrote that the loss of China's current account cushion, softening domestic activity, and upcoming tariffs mean that "for the first time in 25 years, China would have to make a choice between external stability and growth."
Still, with many policy levers still available, China is likely to avoid uncontrolled depreciation, but with little carry protection, UBS believes that it makes sense to remain defensive on the CNY, especially as many currency strategists expect the trade war between the US and China to get worse, pushing the Yuan below Beijing's "redline" of 7.00 vs the dollar.
Which brings us to one of UBS' top recommended themes and trades for 2019, namely "China Stimulus" represented by going long Chinese stocks, and short the Yuan.
As UBS explains, Beijing's dilemma is that Chinese easing now has to balance conflicting demands between external stability and growth. This according to the Swiss bank, "should lead to a welcome, but more limited, stimulus in this cycle and more emphasis on domestic than foreign spending. In turn, this easing cycle will likely provide more benefit to domestic assets rather than traditional China satellites."
In equities, the direct expression of this theme is to be long China A-shares versus EM ex-China, with UBS expecting the coming infrastructure spending in China to have a larger impact on domestic equities than on EM in aggregate, and China equities should have more upside.
Meanwhile, from a portfolio perspective, long USD/CNY combines well with the equity trade, because in the base case, Chinese equites can perform well as the currency weakens. In a more adverse scenario for Chinese equities, the equity trade would likely perform poorly, but USD/CNY should be a good hedge.
To get a sense of the sensitivity between the relative strength of the Yuan and equities, UBS shows the following chart mapping the impact of a 1% change in the USDCNY on global stocks.
Finally, to complete its thematic recommendation, UBS adds a fixed income leg in the form of long Asia HY versus short Asia IG position as "slower Chinese growth, a weaker CNY, and a tight onshore credit environment should push Asia credit spreads wider, but HY should fare relatively better given extreme valuations." Then again, many said the same thing for the US junk bond market until it finally cracked earlier this month...
Fonte: qui

domenica 11 novembre 2018

The "Nightmare Scenario" For Beijing: 50 Million Chinese Apartments Are Empty

Back in 2017, we explained why the "fate of the world economy is in the hands of China's housing bubble." The answer was simple: for the Chinese population, and growing middle class, to keep spending vibrant and borrowing elevated, it had to feel comfortable and confident that its wealth would keep rising. However, unlike the US where the stock market is the ultimate barometer of the confidence boosting "wealth effect", in China it has always been about housing as three quarters of Chinese household assets are parked in real estate, compared to only 28% in the US, with the remainder invested financial assets.

Source: Xinhua

Beijing knows this, of course, which is why China periodically and consistently reflates its housing bubble, hoping that the popping of the bubble, which happened in late 2011 and again in 2014, will be a controlled, "smooth landing" process.  For now, Beijing has been successful in maintaining price stability at least according to official data, allowing the air out of the "Tier 1" home price bubble which peaked in early 2016, while preserving modest home price appreciation in secondary markets.
How long China will be able to avoid a sharp price decline remains to be seen, but in the meantime another problem faces China's housing market: in addition to being the primary source of household net worth - and therefore stable and growing consumption - it has also been a key driver behind China's economic growth, with infrastructure spending and capital investment long among the biggest components of the country's goalseeked GDP. One result has been China's infamous ghost cities, built only for the sake of Keynesian spending to hit a predetermined GDP number that would make Beijing happy.
Meanwhile, in the process of reflating the latest housing bubble, another dire byproduct of this artificial housing "market" has emerged: tens of millions of apartments and houses standing empty across the country.
According to Bloomberg, soon-to-be-published research will show that roughly 22% of China’s urban housing stock is unoccupied, according to Professor Gan Li, who runs the main nationwide study. That amounts to more than 50 million empty homes.
The reason for the massive empty inventory glut: to keep supply low and prices artificially elevated by taking out as much inventory off the market as possible. This, however, works both ways, and while it helps boost prices on the way up as the economy grow and speculators flood the housing market with easy money, the moment the trend flips the spike in supply as empty units are offloaded will lead to a panic liquidation of homes, resulting in what may be the biggest housing market crash ever observed, and putting the US home bubble of 2006 to shame.
Indeed, as Bloomberg notes, the "nightmare scenario" for Chinese authorities is that owners of unoccupied dwellings rush to sell when cracks start appearing in the property market, causing a self-reinforcing downward price spiral.
Worse, the latest data, from a survey in 2017, also suggests Beijing’s efforts to curb property speculation - which alongside shadow banking and the persistent threat of sudden bank runs (like the one discussed last week) is considered by Beijing a key threat to financial and social stability - have failed.
"There’s no other single country with such a high vacancy rate,” said Gan, of Chengdu’s Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. “Should any crack emerge in the property market, the homes to be offloaded will hit China like a flood.”
How did the Chinese researcher obtain this troubling number? To find the percentage of vacant housing, thousands of researchers spread out across 363 Chinese counties last year as part of the China Household Finance Survey, which Gan runs at the university.
Gan said that the vacancy rate, which excludes homes yet to be sold by developers, was little changed from a 2013 reading of 22.4%. And while that study showed 49 million vacant homes, Gan puts the number now at "definitely more than 50 million units."
Meanwhile, Beijing - which is fully aware of these stats, and is also aware that even a modest price decline could be magnified instantly as millions of "for sale" units hit the market at the same time - is worried. That's why Chinese authorities have imposed buying restrictions and limited credit availability, only to see money flooding into other areas. Rampant price gains also mean millions of people are shut out from the market, exacerbating inequality.
In fact, China's president Xi famously said in October last year that "houses are built to be inhabited, not for speculation", and yet a quarter of China's housing is just that: empty, and only serves to amplify speculation.
While holiday homes and the empty dwellings of migrants seeking work elsewhere account for some of the deserted properties, Gan found that investment purchases have been the biggest factor keeping the vacancy rate high. That’s despite curbs across the country meant to discourage buying of multiple dwellings.
There is another economic cost to this speculative frenzy: the drop in supply puts upward pressure on prices and crowds young buyers out of the market, according to Kaiji Chen, who co-authored a Fed paper called “The Great Housing Boom of China." 
And, as Americans so fondly recall, the result of chasing unaffordable homes for the purpose of price speculation has resulted in yet another unprecedented debt bubble: according to Caixin, outstanding personal home mortgages in China have exploded sevenfold from 3 trillion yuan ($430 billion) in 2008 to 22.9 trillion yuan in 2017, according to PBOC data
By the end of September, the value of outstanding home mortgages had surged another 18% Y/Y to a record 24.9 trillion yuan, resulting in a trend that as Caixin notes, has turned many people into what are called “mortgage slaves."
It has also resulted in yet another housing bubble: home mortgage debt now makes up more than half of total household debt in China. As of the third quarter, it accounted for 53% of the 46.2 trillion yuan in outstanding household debt.
For now, few are losing sleep over what will be the next massive housing bubble to burst. An example of a vacant home is a villa on the outskirts of Shanghai that 27-year-old Natalie Feng’s parents bought for her. The two-story residence was meant to be a weekend escape for the family of three. In reality, it’s empty most of the time, and Feng says it’s too much trouble to rent it out.
"For every weekend we spend there, we need to drive for an hour first, and clean up for half a day," Feng said. She joked that she sometimes wishes her parents hadn’t bought it for her in the first place. That’s because any apartment she buys now would count as a second home, which means she’d have to make a bigger down payment.
* * *
What is troubling is that despite relatively stable home prices, the foundations behind the housing market are cracking. As the WSJ recently reported, in early December, a group of homeowners stormed the sales office of their Shanghai complex, "Central Washington", whose developer, Shanghai Zhaoping Real Estate Development, was advertising new apartments at a fraction of the prices of the ones sold earlier in the year. One apartment owner said the new prices suggested the value of the apartment she bought from the developer in March had dropped by about 17.5%.
“There are people who bought multiple homes who are now trying to sell one to pay off the mortgage on another,” said Ran Yunjie, a property agent. One of his clients bought an apartment last year for about $230,000. To find a buyer now, the client would have to drop the price by 60%, according to Ran.
Meanwhile, in a truly concerning demonstration of what will happen when the bubble finally bursts, last month we reported that angry homeowners who paid full price for units at the Xinzhou Mansion residential project in Shangrao attacked the Country Garden sales office in eastern Jiangxi province last week, after finding out it had offered discounts to new buyers of up to 30%.


Country Garden cut the selling price at one of its residential developments by 1/3. Those who paid full price smashed the sales office. Similar incidents had happened before, and will again. It’s impossible to remove “the guarantee of principal”(刚性兑付)in China.

265 people are talking about this
"Property accounts for roughly 70 per cent of urban Chinese families’ total assets – a home is both wealth and status. People don’t want prices to increase too fast, but they don’t want them to fall too quickly either,” said Shao Yu, chief economist at Oriental Securities. "People are so used to rising prices that it never occurred to them that they can fall too. We shouldn’t add to this illusion," Shao added, echoing Ben Bernanke circa 2005.
But the biggest surprise once the music finally stops may be that - as a fascinating WSJ report revealed one year ago - China's housing downturn is likely far, far worse than meets the eye, as under Beijing’s direction more than 200 cities across China for the last three years have been buying surplus apartments from property developers and moving in families from condemned city blocks and nearby villages. China’s Housing Ministry, which is behind the purchases, said it plans to continue the program through 2020. The strategy, supported by central-government bank lending, has rescued housing developers and lifted the property market.
In other words, while China already has a record 50 million empty apartments, the real number - when excluding the government's own stealthy purchases of excess inventory - is likely significantly higher. It is this, and not China's stock market, that has long been the biggest time bomb for Beijing, and if Trump and Peter Navarro truly want to crush China in their ongoing trade war, they should focus on destabilizing the housing market: the Chinese stock market was, and remains just a distraction.
To summarize:
  • China has more than 50 million vacant apartments
  • Mortgage loans have grown 8-fold in the past decade
  • Prices are kept steady thanks to constant government purchases of surplus inventory
  • Home prices are already cracking, with some homebuilders forced to cut prices by 30%.
  • Homebuyers revolt, forming angry militias and storm homesellers' offices when prices dip
For now, China has been able to maintain the illusion of stability to preserve social order. However, should the housing slowdown accelerate significantly and tens of millions in empty units suddenly hit the market, then the "working class insurrection" that China has been preparing for since 2014...

... will become an overnight reality, with dire consequences for the entire world.
Fonte: qui

"A Chinese Recession Is Inevitable" 

Ken Rogoff Ruins 'Decoupled-America' Narrative


Analysts say a Chinese recession would only hurt the region. That may be wishful thinking...
When China finally has its inevitable growth recession – which will almost surely be amplified by a financial crisis, given the economy’s massive leverage – how will the rest of world be affected? With US President Donald Trump’s trade war hitting China just as growth was already slowing, this is no idle question.
Typical estimates, for example those embodied in the International Monetary Fund’s assessments of country risk, suggest an economic slowdown in China will hurt everyone. But the acute pain, according to the IMF, will be more regionally concentrated and confined than would be the case for a deep recession in the United States.
Unfortunately, this might be wishful thinking.
First, the effect on international capital markets could be vastly greater than Chinese capital market linkages would suggest. However jittery global investors may be about prospects for profit growth, a hit to Chinese growth would make things a lot worse. Although it is true that the US is still by far the biggest importer of final consumption goods (a large share of Chinese manufacturing imports are intermediate goods that end up being embodied in exports to the US and Europe), foreign firms nonetheless still enjoy huge profits on sales in China.
Investors today are also concerned about rising interest rates, which not only put a damper on consumption and investment, but also reduce the market value of companies (particularly tech firms) whose valuations depend heavily on profit growth far in the future. A Chinese recession could again make the situation worse.
I appreciate the usual Keynesian thinking that if any economy anywhere slows, this lowers world aggregate demand, and therefore puts downward pressure on global interest rates. But modern thinking is more nuanced. High Asian saving rates over the past two decades have been a significant factor in the low overall level of real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates in both the US and Europe, thanks to the fact that underdeveloped Asian capital markets simply cannot constructively absorb the surplus savings.
Former US Federal Reserve chair Ben Bernanke famously characterised this much-studied phenomenon as a key component of the “global savings glut”. Thus, instead of leading to lower global real interest rates, a Chinese slowdown that spreads across Asia could paradoxically lead to higher interest rates elsewhere – especially if a second Asian financial crisis leads to a sharp draw-down of central bank reserves. Thus, for global capital markets, a Chinese recession could easily prove to be a double whammy.
As bad as a slowdown in exports to China would be for many countries, a significant rise in global interest rates would be much worse. Eurozone leaders, particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel, get less credit than they deserve for holding together the politically and economically fragile single currency against steep economic and political odds. But their task would have been well-nigh impossible but for the ultra-low global interest rates that have allowed politically paralysed eurozone officials to skirt needed debt write-downs and restructurings in the periphery.
When the advanced countries had their financial crisis a decade ago, emerging markets recovered relatively quickly, thanks to low debt levels and strong commodity prices. Today, however, debt levels have risen significantly, and a sharp rise in global real interest rates would almost certainly extend today’s brewing crises beyond the handful of countries (including Argentina and Turkey) that have already been hit.
Nor is the US immune. For the moment, the US can finance its trillion-dollar deficits at relatively low cost. But the relatively short-term duration of its borrowing – under four years if one integrates the Treasury and Federal Reserve balance sheets – means that a rise in interest rates would soon cause debt service to crowd out needed expenditures in other areas. At the same time, Trump’s trade war also threatens to undermine the US economy’s dynamism. Its somewhat arbitrary and politically driven nature makes it at least as harmful to US growth as the regulations Trump has so proudly eliminated. Those who assumed that Trump’s stance on trade was mostly campaign bluster should be worried.
The good news is that trade negotiations often seem intractable until the 11th hour. The US and China could reach an agreement before Trump’s punitive tariffs go into effect on 1 January. Such an agreement, one hopes, would reflect a maturing of China’s attitude toward intellectual property rights – akin to what occurred in the US during the late 19th century. (In America’s high growth years, US entrepreneurs often thought little of pilfering patented inventions from the United Kingdom.)
A recession in China, amplified by a financial crisis, would constitute the third leg of the debt super-cycle that began in the US in 2008 and moved to Europe in 2010. Up to this point, the Chinese authorities have done a remarkable job in postponing the inevitable slowdown. Unfortunately, when the downturn arrives, the world is likely to discover that China’s economy matters even more than most people thought.
Authored by Kenneth Rogoff, op-ed via The Guardian


giovedì 1 novembre 2018

Is The Long-Anticipated Crash Now Upon Us?

Is this the market's breaking point?

I admit: I'm a permabear.
This is no surprise to those who know and have followed me over the years. But I'm publicly proclaiming my 'bearishness' because doing so might open up a needed and long overdue dialog.
Here's my fundamental position:  Infinite growth on a finite planet is impossible. 
Cutting to the chase, this is why I predict a major crash/collapse across stocks, bonds and real estate is on the way. 
The recent market weakness seen over the past two weeks is nothing compared to what's in store.  As we’ve been carefully chronicling, bubbles burst from ‘the outside in’, starting at the weaker places at the periphery before progressing to the center.
Emerging market equities are now down -26% from their January highs and -18% year-to-date.  China's stock market is down -32%, even with substantial intervention by the government to prop things up.
The periphery has been weakening all year, and the contagion has now spead worldwide.
Taken as a whole, global equities have shed some $13 trillion of market capitalization for a -15% decline:
The rot has spread to the core with surprising speed. Now even the formerly bullet-proof US equity markets are stumbling.
The S&P 500 is now negative on the year:
It’s been obvious for a long time to those who have watched The Crash Course that endless growth is simply not possible. Not for a bacteria colony in a petrie dish, not for an economy, not for any species on the planet. Eventually, when finite resources are involved, limits matter.
But the vast majority of society pretends as if this isn't true.
The US government is (and has been for decades) adding to its massive pile of debt at a rate far faster than it's income (GDP) is growing. Pension managers have a horizon measued in decades, and yet they buy stocks and bonds that can only pay off if endless growth occurs (e.g., 100+ P/E ratios). Much of today's buildings and public works will need to be rebuilt/replaced within the next 50 years, yet no one is certain whether we'll have enough affordable energy to do so.
In regards to the financial markets specifically, history has given us clear lessons to heed. 1929, 1987, 2001 and 2008 each showed us that when the world gets so manic that investors must believe in perpetual perfection/endless growth to justify current asset prices, a painful correction ensues as the limits of reality re-assert themselves.

Bulls vs. Bears

My permabear-ishness is a by-product of peering into the future and not being able to align society's hopes with what I see as the current trajectory of the world.
As a baby boomer, this sets me apart somewhat from my age cohort, many of whom have benefitted as our generation has lived beyond its means. But it’s not all unusual to find young adults, peering ahead into a diminished future, who share my views. 
So when I look at today's markets, I ask: What’s the purpose or point of investing in financial assets that, by definition, depend upon a logical fallacy (endless growth) being true? None at all.
Now, in the short term, if you believe yourself to be smarter and more nimble than the rest, maybe you can find advantage in speculating over the short term. (And good luck with that, by the way...)
But for the average person? Is parking money in a 401k in a general index fund(s), crossing one’s fingers and hoping that the next twenty years will behave like the last twenty a good bet? Not if sustained economic growth continues to remain elusive the way it has since the 2008 crisis.

The Bull Trap

By definition, stock market bulls believe in growth, specifically endless growth. They believe, over time, the markets will head ever upwards.
As I’ve said I don’t believe that endless growth is possible. But more than that, I think, were it possible, it would be harmful to humans and planetary life in general.   
I used to believe in growth. In my early career as a consultant, I even helped companies chase it. But as I became more familiar with the scientific data and connected a few dots, I realized my views regarding growth were naive. And in some cases entirely backwards.
For instance: In my MBA courses, I was taught that at a high enough price, new supply will always emerge to meet the market demand. 
But a tiny bit of inquiry quickly reveals that the economy doesn’t deliver resources, instead we have an economy because there are natural resources to use.  No resources, no economy. The economy is a subset of the natural world, not the other way around. 
Most people get that intuitively, but it remains a mystery why so many stumble on the idea that ever moreeconomic growth requires ever more resources. They ignore the reality that, at some point, resource limits matter.
And within the resource story, energy is THE master resource. No energy and you can’t have anything else. No economy. Nothing.   
Even more precisely, surplus energy (also called "net energy") is what powers everything you and I hold dear about our amazing, just-in-time, global lifestyle. If a Cheetah expends more calories hunting than it actually catches, it dies.  Every organism only thrives if it has a surplus of chemical energy compared to what it expends. 
Simply put, humans are using up hundreds of millions of years of stored ancient sunlight (via fossil fuels) in the equivalent of a geological microsecond. It's been a one-time-only bonanza for our species. One that is fast approaching it's end.
Hey, it’s been fun. And we’re doing some really cool things with all that surplus fossil energy, like space travel and smart phones. But one thing we haven't done is invest for a future that will function when all that tasty surplus fossil energy is gone.
And as we've often written about, the ramifications are already beginning to be felt, and will only get worse over the coming decades.
A critical factor is that our system for running the world is becoming increasingly unstable. As surplus energy decreases, we are using more and more debt to pull tomorrow's prosperity into today to keep the party going.
But that can't last forever. And as 2008 showed us, when the debt stops growing, even briefly, the whole system shudders to a stop. Our current system of credit/money is either expanding or threatening to collapse. It no longer has a middle ground:

The Social Fabric Is Starting To Rend

This idea of growth being dependent on surplus energy is not a very difficult train of logic to follow. But as I’ve learned the hard way when delivering this message over the years, data and logic rarely changes people's behavoir. 
People's actions are governed by their beliefs, which are stubbornly housed in our brain's emotional limbic system, not in the more rational cortex. When beliefs get challenged, emotions flare up. Data is irrelevant. Logic doesn’t matter. The backfire effect mushrooms and takes over.
We are now at the most important inflection point in all of human history, yet practically nobody knows about it. But try to raise people's awareness and – wow – does it ever challenge their belief systems. Fear and anger are the first emotions to get triggered, and listeners quickly search for any reason to reject the information.
This is wack-job conspiracy theory! This is failed Malthusian claptrap! This is fear-mongering! You're underestimating human ingenuity! If this were really true, I'd be reading about it in the media!
Over the years, I've heard thousands of these 'reasons' to reject looking critically at the data. It no longer bothers me, as I recognize it for what it truly is: an attempt to protect oneself from having to grapple with the possibility that the promise of endless growth, which our current prosperity is based on, just might not be real.
And I think many folks are nevertheless becoming aware of this on a subconcious level. It's that feeling in our gut we get when we see the 1% live so much better than the rest of us 99%. When we hear how "great" the employment rate is or the stock market is, yet we see so many households struggling to get by as the middle class get squeezed harder and harder between stagnant wages and the rising cost of living. When we see those who run our country and its corporations live by a different, more preferential, set of rules than the public is held to.
I think this explains why tensions and tempers are so high right now, even though very few seem to understand why. It explains why the country is so divided and increasingly desperate. It explains the hyper-partisanship, the turn to opioids, the pipe bombs.
To my way of thinking, a lot of the emotional energy being expended right now is due to the fact that our entire way of being is busy collapsing all around us.  Our main narrative of “how life works” is breaking down. This is resuting in an epidemic of grief, depression, anger and sorrow.
(Personal note: If you're near Turners Falls MA on November 6th, 2018 I and a number of other PP members will be attending Stephen Jenkinson’s Nights of Grief & Mystery Tour, which delves into coping strategies for dealing with these emotions head-on. If you want to join us, send an email here).

Is The Crash Upon Us?

So with the wipeout of all 2018's market gains this week, is the next crash upon us? Is the financial system in the process of breaking down, as it did in 2008?
There are a number of indicators we watch closely here at Peak Prosperity. While many are showing signs of distress, we're not yet seeing the kind of systemic arrest we'd expect to see preceding a market seisure. 
For instance, even as equities have pulled back, the weakest credit element, here represented by the ETF “JNK” that tracks junk bonds, has barely even budged during the current sell-off:
What tipped me off as a pre-indicator of the 2008 crash was the movement in both the credit markets and the financial companies most dependent on them. Remember, "stocks are for show but bonds are for dough". The serious money playing in the bond market typcially seeks safety before the more risk-loving players in the equity markets catch on.
Similarly, the prices for 'safe haven' US Treasury hasn't rallied by all that much. If there were a panic brewing, we'd expect to see these spiking more violently, even with China beginning to sell their stash and the Fed pulling back:
That “bounce” doesn’t even bring US 20-year bonds back to even for the month of October, let alone return them to where they were in September.
Similarly, gold hasn't rallied that much either in US dollar terms (in euros and yuan is another matter):
Add to the above that the US economy is not (yet) in recession, and a full-blown crash looks unlikely to unfold before us right now.
BUT, what we are seeing in the markets is exactly the kind of precusor activity we would expect to see in the final stage leading up to a crash.
In Part 2: How Close?, we lay out the indicators we're watching most closely and what they're currently forecasting about the timing of a major market breakdown, as well as reinforce the importance of prudently preparing yourself *now*.
This equity correction has my full attention. No, I don’t think it’s the big one (yet). But, yes, I think the big one is not far behind
In the immediate here and now, focus on getting yourself prepared as best as you can and remain above the emotional fray that's tormenting so many people. It's only going to get worse from here.
Click here to read Part 2 of this report (free executive summary, enrollment required for full access
Fonte: qui

Expect A "Lost Decade", Mish Warns Stock Market Rout "Only Just Starting"

October has been a terrible month for equities. Yet, this is only a start of what's to come...

Decline Barely Started

Despite the rout, the S&P is just barely down for the year.

Expect a "Lost Decade"

Why?

The Shiller PE Ratio also known as "CAPE", the Cyclically Adjusted Price-Earnings Ratio, is in the stratosphere. It's not a timing mechanism, rather it's a warning mechanism.
The main idea is that earnings are mean reverting.
On that basis, stocks are more overvalued than any time other than the DotCom era.
But that is misleading. In 2000 there were many sectors that were extremely cheap. Energy was a standout buy then. So were retail and financials.
It's difficult to find any undervalued sectors now other than gold.

Financial Crisis Coming

At 1:40 AM (this morning), I posted Eight Reasons a Financial Crisis is Coming.
It's been about 10 years since the last financial crisis. FocusEconomics wants to know if another one is due. The short answer is yes.


"Peak QE": This Is What Share Of The Market Central Banks Now Own

After a decade of unprecedented liquidity injections by central banks to preserve the western financial system, global QE has peaked.
First, the aggregate balance sheet of major central banks started to shrink earlier in the year, a reversal that took investors many months to notice but judging by recent market volatility, it is finally being fully appreciated.
Second, beginning this month the Fed's bond portfolio run-offs as part of its QT are roughly offsetting the combined tapered net QE purchases by the ECB and BoJ. Worse, QT is now set to dominate.
Some facts: between mid-2008 and early 2018, the "Big-6" central banks expanded their balance sheets by nearly $15tn, most of it due to explicit targeted purchases of domestic assets (QE) in addition to other forms of liquidity injections (collateralised lending such as the ECB's TLTROs or FX interventions equivalent to foreign-asset QE).
According to Deutsche Bank estimates, the four major central banks involved in QE (Fed, ECB, BoJ and BoE) are now collectively holding $11.3tn of securities accumulated through their asset purchase programs.
Why is the above important? Because as Deutsche strategist Michal Jezek, now that liquidity is contracting makes for a timely moment for looking at the proportion of relevant asset classes owned by central banks and putting the ECB's corporate bond holdings into a wider context.
To begin, as Jezek confirms what we have been saying since the start of 2009, "clearly, QE matters." As central banks reduced the free float of some securities and QE has worked its magic on confidence and growth, asset valuations reached unprecedented levels while volatility became suppressed. A couple of years ago, a quarter of the global bond market was trading with a negative yield. With global QE fading, this proportion has now fallen by half but remains significant.
And the combined valuation of global bonds and stocks has more than doubled since the crisis, led by stocks.
So in light of the recent jump in volatility, and given potentially fragile valuations, QE tapering has been gradual and well telegraphed with the aim to minimize disruptions. Certainly in the case of the ECB CSPP, the market has focused on the taper for quite some time and while many believe it has been largely priced in, Italian bondholders are becoming increasingly uncertain if that is indeed the case.
That said, as DB cautiously admits, "the end of the overall ECB QE and start of global QT may not have been fully internalised by the market yet and the absence of a large, price-insensitive buyer of last resort should keep volatility higher."
To be sure, acquiring a portion (or most) of a securities market over time does not necessarily mean shrinking it. Consider that while the ECB took nearly €175BN of Eurozone corporate bonds out of circulation but net issuance over that period has nearly offset it and broader net issuance from global IG corporates in EUR has well exceeded that volume, as we show in our most recent Issuance and Fund Flows report.
However, QE does shrink the market compared to the counterfactual of no QE because the extra supply response (more issuance because the central bank is buying) should normally be a lot smaller than the net amount bought.
With that in mind, Deutsche Bank presents its estimates of the share of relevant asset classes owned by central banks. The most extreme case is Japan where the BoJ owns almost half of the JGB market, followed by the Eurozone where the ECB holds nearly a third of the relevant covered bond market. Other than that the central banks own 20-25% of their government bond markets and 15-20% of the relevant part of the ABS/MBS market.
As Jezek next notes, compared to all the above numbers, it might seem that there is less scarcity in the Eurozone corporate bond space with the ECB owning "only" about 8.5% of the relevant bond universe (and 20% of the CSPP-eligible subset worth €850bn +). While there is a much greater liquidity constraint than in government bond markets, it is probably true that if healthy net issuance continues, the ECB could carry on conducting meaningful net CSPP purchases well beyond 2018.
Why would they?
According to Deutsche, one reason is that they might decide to put more weight on corporate and less weight on government bonds in their upcoming reinvestment strategy, with zero net QE. Against that, there seems to be limited willingness of the ECB to take unsecured corporate exposures given their recent experience with the troubled Steinhoff and Atlantia credits in the CSPP portfolio. In other words, it now seems more likely that the ownership share will slowly begin to decline as net corporate purchases cease and the IG market keeps growing.
Unless of course the European bond market suffers a cardiac arrest, in which case the ECB will go all out again.
And while the BoE owns about 3% of the UK GBP IG market given its CBPS programme was limited in scale from inception, in bank-based Japan (with a less developed and small corporate bond market) the BoJ has accumulated some 15%, by our estimates.
Looking ahead, Deutsche Bank suggests that as global QT sets in, the turn in the credit cycle still seems relatively distant, with default rates low and still falling, while declining issuance in US high yield has kept spreads supernaturally tight.

The bank forecasts lower but still decent growth at least through 2020 with rate curves bear steepening in the next couple of quarters not only in Europe (consensus) but also in the US (non-consensus) before they start flattening into a slowdown.
Fonte: qui