9 dicembre forconi: 10/17/18

mercoledì 17 ottobre 2018

Le sofferenze delle banche italiane cominciano dai Btp

Chi si domanda perché mai le banche italiane (ma anche le assicurazioni) guardino febbrilmente all’aumento degli spread dei nostri titoli di stato rispetto al Bund tedesco deve tenere a mente un paio di cose che sono successe negli ultimi sei mesi: lo spread è costantemente cresciuto, e lo consistenze dei titoli pubblici nelle nostre banche pure. Ecco cosa è successo lato spread.
Stavamo intorno a 120 punti a fine aprile, e abbiamo toccato i 315 il 9 ottobre. Quasi 200 punti in più. Possiamo stimare, moltiplicando 200 punti base per la durata media del nostro debito che è di circa 7 anni, che il valore teorico dei Btp italiani sia diminuito mediamente di circa il 14%. Quindi anche di quelli in pancia alle banche. A proposito, andiamo a vedere le ultime consistenze dall’ultimo bollettino statistico della Banca d’Italia.
Come si può vedere ad aprile le consistenze di titoli pubblici ad aprile erano pari a 341 miliardi di euro circa, 250 dei quali erano Btp. Le consistenze aumentano gradualmente nel mese di maggio in poi, arrivando a 373 miliardi a fine luglio. Tale aumento di consistenze, a fronte di un aumento dello spread, che ha diminuito il valore dello stock esistente, può spiegarsi solo a fronte di maggiori acquisti. Ossia le banche hanno comprato titoli pubblici, malgrado le perdite sullo stock provocate dall’aumento dello spread. Il calo di agosto delle consistenze, diminuite a 364 miliardi, può spiegarsi o con la decisione delle banche di vendere titoli, o di smettere di comprarne, o con una erosione del valore dello stock. Probabilmente le tre cose sono accadute insieme. Rimane il fatto che la prima fonte di sofferenza per le banche italiane negli ultimi sei mesi non è stato il debito delle imprese. E’ stato il Btp.
Fonte: qui

BANCHE ITALIANE in TILT. Cosa succede e chi è a rischio?

I supervisori europei stanno monitorando la liquidità delle banche italiane “con molta preoccupazione”






Con i rendimenti dei titoli di stato italiani che negli ultimi mesi sono arrivati ai massimi livelli in oltre 4 anni, il settore che è stato il più colpito è stato quello bancario, il quale ha perso un terzo del suo valore di mercato nei sei mesi successivi al picco di aprile.





Mentre i rendimenti più elevati tendono ad essere positivi per le banche locali, le quali possono guadagnare un profitto maggiore sul margine d'interesse netto, l'Italia negli ultimi anni è stata un caso emblematico in cui le cose sono andate "alla rovescia", in gran parte a causa delle massicce riserve di debito sovrano italiano nelle banche nazionali.

E, come ha scritto di recente Bloomberg, mentre i bilanci delle banche italiane sono molto migliorati dalla crisi del debito sovrano nel 2011, le banche hanno utilizzato gran parte dei fondi successivamente iniettati dalla Banca Centrale Europea per acquistare ancora più debito sovrano.

Come mostrato di seguito, le istituzioni finanziarie del Paese detengono di gran lunga il maggior numero di obbligazioni statali tra i creditori in Europa. In particolare, secondo i dati della BCE, le banche italiane detengono circa €375 miliardi di obbligazioni nazionali (o il 10% dei loro attivi) e l'impennata dei rendimenti, danneggiando il valore di tali possedimenti, erode i loro livelli di capitale rendendole particolarmente vulnerabili ad ulteriori aumenti.





Ciò significa che quando i prezzi dei titoli italiani crollano, come stanno facendo ora, ciò porta alla sottocapitalizzazione delle banche e, se il calo dei prezzi è abbastanza ampio, potrebbe addirittura portare all'insolvenza bancaria.

Di qui l'aumento dei prezzi delle azioni e l'aumento dei CDS al crescere delle probabilità di default.





Commentando questo problema strutturale che affligge le banche italiane, Luigi Zingales, professore di finanza presso la School of Business dell'Università di Chicago, ha dichiarato a fine settembre che "l'Italia si trova di fronte ad un circolo vizioso che può portare ad una crisi simile a quella del 2011". Peggio ancora, Zingales ha avvertito che "dal 2011 non è cambiato nulla a livello europeo" aggiungendo che "senza il completamento delle misure bancarie e di sostegno, l'Italia rischia una spirale negativa come accaduto nel 2011. L'incertezza sta facendo salire gli spread delle obbligazioni, influenzando così i bilanci delle banche ed il loro costo di finanziamento, e in ultima analisi la loro capacità di dare credito".

Ecco che ritorna la proverbiale spirale distruttiva.

Ora sembra che l'Europa stessa stia cominciando ad essere preoccupata perché, secondo la Reutersle autorità europee di vigilanza bancaria hanno intensificato il monitoraggio dei livelli di liquidità delle banche italiane a causa delle turbolenze nei mercati dei giorni scorsi, cosa che ha provocato un forte aumento dei rendimenti dei titoli di stato del Paese.

E visto che l'Italia è l'unica nazione che, dopo la Grecia, corre il rischio più alto di una corsa agli sportelli bancarie, l'ultima cosa che l'UE vuole (o la BCE può permettersi) è innescare un panico bancario con la notizia che le banche ora sono "intensamente monitorate", così la Reuters ha citato una fonte europea di alto livello la quale ha affermato che "non c'è motivo di allarmarsi".

Naturalmente l'alternativa vuole che ci sia ragione di allarmarsi, e si formerebbero improvvisamente file per ritirare i propri depositi e risparmi e poi parcheggiarli in un qualche posto molto più sicuro.

Secondo la Reuters, il monitoraggio UE riguarda sia i depositi dei clienti sia il mercato interbancario, utilizzato dalle banche per prestarsi denaro reciprocamente senza richiedere garanzie collaterali, ha detto la fonte, aggiungendo che non c'è "nessun segnale di allarme".

Inoltre l'ampia liquidità fornita dalla BCE durante anni di politica monetaria ultraespansionistica sta proteggendo il mercato interbancario da qualsiasi tensione, hanno detto i trader di Milano.

Ancora più importante, le banche italiane non hanno visto alcuna fuga di depositi nonostante le recenti turbolenze sui mercati ed i prezzi delle banche in ribasso: a luglio i depositi nelle banche italiane erano a €2,390 miliardi, in calo da €2,410 miliardi a giugno.

Questo potrebbe cambiare presto se l'UE continuerà a scavare, spingendo la popolazione locale a chiedersi perché Bruxelles è così nervosa.

Nel frattempo l'Italia continua la disputa con l'UE sul suo bilancio, lo spread del debito sovrano continua a salire e gli analisti di Credit Suisse avvertono che uno spread superiore a 400 punti base non sarebbe sostenibile per le banche italiane.Secondo le stime, un ampliamento di 200 punti base a partire da fine giugno ridurrebbe in media il coefficiente patrimoniale dei creditori italiani di 66 punti base. E questo potrebbe innescare la necessità di un aumento di capitale, hanno detto gli analisti, incluso Carlo Tommaselli.





Per ora, il motivo principale per cui i depositanti locali sono rimasti ottimisti malgrado il calo dei prezzi delle azioni e l'accelerazione del declino della capitalizzazione, è che molti confidano che il capo della BCE, Mario Draghi, non permetterà mai che le banche italiane falliscano. Ma alla luce dell'attuale governo populista, può essere un'ipotesi ottimistica: dopo tutto, quale modo migliore per impartire al nuovo governo di coalizione una lezione se non lasciare che i rendimenti salgano ancora più in alto e mandino in bancarotta una o più banche, concentrando la rabbia pubblica sul governo Di Maio-Salvini?

Per ora la BCE si è rifiutata di giocare questo asso nella manica, anche se a giudicare dall'impennata dei rendimenti, non è intervenuta neanche con acquisti aggressivi. In agosto, Goldman Sachs ha sottolineato che le banche italiane spesso forniscono una fonte costante di domanda nei momenti di crisi, ma che il crescente rischio politico ed i cambiamenti normativi potrebbero renderle più riluttanti ad intervenire.

E la ragione principale di ciò è che, dopo 3 anni, il Q€ della BCE sta finalmente giungendo al termine.





Questo è il motivo per cui mentre gli ispettori dell'UE ritengono che non ci sia "nulla per cui allarmarsi", potrebbero voler vigilare attentamente per i prossimi 3 mesi, sempre più vicini al giorno in cui la BCE non monetizzerà più il debito italiano e non supporterà più le banche italiane. Non saremmo sorpresi se, pochi giorni prima della suddetta scadenza, inizieranno a formarsi le temute file di depositanti davanti le banche...


[*] traduzione di Francesco Simoncellihttps://www.francescosimoncelli.com/
BANCHE ITALIANE in TILT. Cosa succede e chi è a rischio?
BANCHE ITALIANE in TILT. Cosa succede e chi è a rischio?
BANCHE ITALIANE in TILT. Cosa succede e chi è a rischio?

Frame, Bund e Tbond dimostrano che i porti sicuri non esistono più




Frame, Bund e Tbond dimostrano che i porti sicuri non esistono più

Quanto sta accadendo a Bund e Tbond dimostra che i porti sicuri non esistono più per gli investitori. Lo stottolinea Michele De Michelis, responsabile investimenti di Frame asset managament, società indipendente specializzata in gestioni patrimoniali a ritorno assoluto.


"Quanto accaduto negli ultimi 15 giorni conferma la mancanza di porti sicuri in un contesto in cui le variabili politiche potevano danneggiare in qualunque momento gli asset finanziari, che sono estremamente sensibili in questo momento ad ogni notizia in arrivo dalla politica", dice De Michelis, continuando "Guardate cosa è accaduto ai Bund tedeschi decennali a seguito della decisione del governo italiano di aumentare il deficit al 2,4%. Se è vero che nell'immediato sono stati oggetto del cosiddetto "flight to quality", ovvero hanno visto il rendimento abbassarsi facendo impennare lo spread con il Btp italiano, già dopo qualche giorno sono diventati oggetto di vendite, con il tasso tornato a salire", dice De Michelis.

Lo stesso accade al di là dell'oceano. "Stessa cosa dicasi per i T-bond americani, dove è stato superato e poi consolidato il livello di 3,2%, con un aumento di oltre 30 punti base in un mese. Questo movimento pare essere stato originato dalle vendite sui governativi americani da parte degli investitori cinesi, che sfruttano quest'arma finanziaria per fronteggiare la guerra dei dazi. Tutto questo ha comportato sostanziali perdite nel valore delle obbligazioni e di conseguenza dei fondi obbligazionari, tanto cari ai risparmiatori con un basso profilo di rischio", dice De Michelis.

Intanto "Le borse mondiali invece si sono mangiate in pochi giorni il rally che era iniziato in settembre (dove il mercato americano aveva addirittura visto segnare nuovi massimi) con una correzione che si è rivelata più marcata per il settore tecnologico", aggiunge De Michelis.
La conclusione a cui si arriva è che "quindi, se escludiamo il conto corrente (sulla cui eventuale certezza di "safe haven" reale potremmo disquisire per ore) altri investimenti "sicuri" non ne abbiamo visti. Solo poche strategie alternative sono riuscite ad ottenere rendimenti positivi in questa fase", dice l'esperto.

"Il vero quesito amletico adesso sta nel capire se questa crescita globale, che comunque sta proseguendo, sia in grado di sopportare ulteriori rialzi dei tassi di interesse e fino a che punto questi rialzi impatteranno in maniera decisa sui prezzi degli asset finanziari. In caso di uno scenario negativo, quindi, mi aspetterei non una correzione, come quella che stiamo vedendo in questi giorni, ma un vero e proprio bear market, che secondo me potrebbe essere ancor più marcato sui mercati obbligazionari rispetto a quelli azionari", ricorda De Michelis, avvertendo "Non sto affermando che i benchmark obbligazionari scenderanno in termini assoluti più di quelli azionari, ma mi soffermo sulle conseguenze che tale eventualità possa provocare nella psicologia di un investitore a basso rischio. Vedere -15% su un portafoglio obbligazionario governativo o investment grade, magari comprato solo due anni fa, potrebbe essere più scioccante rispetto ad un -25 % per un investitore azionario abituato al rischio di mercato. Ecco perché l’investitore obbligazionario potrebbe essere indotto a liquidare tutto".

Le conseguenze sono facilmente immaginabili: "assenza di liquidità sul mercato (a meno di un aiutino da parte delle banche centrali) e allargamenti degli spread denaro lettera tipici dei momenti di crisi. 

Tanti che perderanno tanti soldi e pochi che invece ne faranno tanti, come al solito. Perchè come si dice in Toscana, in quei momenti si tende a "buttar via il bimbo con l'acqua sporca", ovvero ci si disfa di tutto, anche degli investimenti buoni. Basta ricordare cosa accadde nel 2009. Comunque, la sensazione è che nell'immediato questa sia ancora una opportunità di entrata e che si possa assistere ad un'ultima gamba di rialzo, anche per motivi stagionali e una volta venuto meno l'incertezza delle politiche americane di mid term. Ovviamente mi riferisco al mercato che guida gli altri, quello nord-americano", dice De Michelis, concludendo "Se sale infatti forse salgono anche gli altri, se scende, scendono sicuramente gli altri. Dopodichè sarà veramente difficile capire il timing, per quello preferisco avere protezioni ed equity di qualità che falsi asset sicuri".

Fonte: qui

A Global People’s Bailout for the Coming Financial Crash

When the global financial crisis resurfaces, we the people will have to fill the vacuum in political leadership. It will call for a monumental mobilisation of citizens from below, focused on a single and unifying demand for a people’s bailout across the world.
***
A full decade since the great crash of 2008, many progressive thinkers have recently reflected on the consequences of that fateful day when the investment bank Lehman Brothers collapsed, foreshadowing the worst international financial crisis of the post-war period. What seems obvious to everyone is that lessons have not been learnt, the financial sector is now larger and more dominant than ever, and an even greater crisis is set to happen anytime soon. But the real question is when it strikes, what are the chances of achieving a bailout for ordinary people and the planet this time?
In the aftermath of the last global financial meltdown, there was a constant stream of analysis about its proximate causes. This centred on the bursting of the US housing bubble, fuelled in large part by reckless sub-prime lending and an under-regulated shadow banking system. Media commentaries fixated on the implosion of collateralised debt obligations, credit default swaps and other financial innovations—all evidence of the speculative greed and lax government oversight which led to the housing and credit booms.
The term ‘financialisation’ has become a buzzword to explain the factors which precipitated these events, referring to the vastly expanded role of financial markets in the operation of domestic and global economies. It is not only about the growth of big banks and hedge funds, but the radical transformation of our entire society that has taken place as a result of the increasing dominance of the financial sector with its short-termist, profitmaking logic.
The origins of the crisis are rooted in the early 1970s, when the US government decided to end the fixed convertibility of dollars into gold, formally ending the Bretton Woods monetary system. It marked the beginning of a new regime of floating exchange rates, free trade in goods and the free movement of capital across borders. The sweeping reforms brought in under the Thatcher and Reagan governments accelerated a wave of deregulation and privatisation, with minimum protective barriers against the ‘self-regulating market’.
The agenda was pushed aggressively by most national governments in the Global North, while being imposed on many Southern countries through the International Monetary Fund and World Bank’s infamous ‘structural adjustment programmes’. A legion of books have examined the disastrous consequences of this market-led approach to monetary and fiscal policy, derisorily labelled the neoliberal Washington Consensus. As governments increasingly focused on maintaining low inflation and removing regulations on capital and corporations, the world of finance boomed—and the foundations were laid for a dramatic dénouement in 2008.
Missed opportunities
What’s extraordinary to recall about the immediate aftermath of the great crash is the temporary reversal of those policies that had dominated the previous two decades. At the G20 summit in April 2009 hosted by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, heads of state envisaged a return to Keynesian macroeconomic prescriptions, including a large-scale fiscal stimulus in both developed and developing countries. It appeared that the Washington Consensus had suddenly lost all legitimacy. The liberalised global financial system had clearly failed to provide for a net transfer of resources to the developing world, or prevent instability and recurrent crisis without effective state regulation and democratic public oversight.
Many civil society organisations saw the moment to call for fundamental reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as a complete rethink of the role of the state in the economy. There was even talk of negotiating a new Bretton Woods agreement that re-regulates international capital flows, and supports policy diversity and multilateralism as a core principle (in direct contrast to the IMF’s discredited  approach).
The United Nations played a staunch role in upholding such demands, particularly through a commission set up by the then-President of the UN General Assembly, Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann.Led by Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, the ‘UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development’ proposed a number of sensible measures to protect the least privileged citizens from the effects of the crisis, while giving developing countries greater influence in reforming the global economy.
Around the same time, the UN Secretary-General endorsed a Global Green New Deal that could stimulate an economic recovery, combat poverty and avert dangerous climate change simultaneously. It envisioned a massive programme of direct public investments and other internationally-coordinated interventions, arguing that the time had come to transform the global economy for the greater benefit of people everywhere, including the millions living in poverty in developing and emerging industrial economies.
This wasn’t the first time that nations were called upon to enact a full-scale reordering of global priorities in response to financial turmoil. At the onset of the ‘third world’ debt crisis in 1980, an Independent Commission on International Development Issuesconvened by the former West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, also proposed far-reaching emergency measures to reform the global economic system and effectively bail out the world’s poor.
Yet the Brandt Commission proposals were widely ignored by Western governments at the time, which marked the rise of the neoliberal counterrevolution in macroeconomic policy—and all the conditions that led to financial breakdown three decades later. Then once again, governments responded in precisely the opposite direction for bringing about a sustainable economic recovery based on principles of equity, justice, sharing and human rights.
A world falling apart
We are all familiar with the course of action taken from 2008-9: colossal bank bailouts enacted (without public consultation) that favoured creditors, not debtors, despite using taxpayer money. Quantitative easing (QE) programmes that have pumped trillions of dollars into the global financial system, unleashing a fresh wave of speculative investment and further widening income and wealth gaps. And the perceived blame for the crisis deflected towards excessive public spending, leading to fiscal austerity measures being rolled out across most countries—a ‘decade of adjustment’ that is projected to affect nearly 80 percent of the global population by 2020.
Source: eyewashdesgin: A. Golden, flickr creative commons
To be sure, the ensuing policy responses across Europe were often compared to structural adjustment programmes imposed on developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, when repayments to creditors of commercial banks similarly took precedence over measures to ensure social and economic recovery. The same pattern has repeated in every crisis-hit region, where the poorest in society pay the price through extreme austerity and the privatisation of public assets and services, despite being the least to blame for causing the crisis in the first place.
After ten years of these policies a new billionaire is created every second day, banks are still paying out billions of dollars in bonuses each year, and the top 1% of the world population are far wealthier than before the crisis happened. At the same time, global income inequality has returned to 1820 levels, and indicators suggest progress is now reversing on the prevention of extreme poverty and multiple forms of malnutrition.
Indeed the United Nations continues to face the worst humanitarian situation since the second world war, in large part due to conflict-driven crises that are rooted in the economic fallout of the 2008 crash—most dramatically in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Countries of both the Global North and South remain in the grip of a record upsurge of forced human displacement, to which governments are predictably failing to respond to in the direction of cooperative burden sharing through agreements and institutions at the international level.
Not to mention the rise of fascism and divisive populism that is escalating in almost every society, often as a misguided response to pervasive inequality and a widespread sense of unfairness among ordinary workers. It is surely reasonable to suggest that all these trends would not be deteriorating if the community of nations had seized the opportunity a decade ago, and acted in accordance with calls for a just transition to a more equitable world order.
The worst is yet to come
We now live in a strange era of political limbo. Neoclassical economics may have failed to predict the great crash or provide answers for a sustained recovery, yet it still retains its hold on conventional academic thought. Neoliberalism may also be discredited as the dominant political and economic paradigm, yet mainstream institutions like the IMF and OECD still embrace the fundamentals of free market orthodoxy and countenance no meaningful alternative. Consequently, the new regulatory initiatives agreed at the global level are largely voluntary and inadequate, and governments have done little to counter the power of oligopolistic banks or prevent reckless speculative behaviour.
Banks may be relatively safer and possess a bigger crisis toolkit, but the risk has moved to the largely unregulated shadow banking system which has massively increased in size, growing from $28 trillion in 2010 to $45 trillion in 2018. Even major banks like JP Morgan are forewarning an imminent crisis, which may be caused by a digital ‘flash crash’ in which high frequency investments (measuring trades in millionths of a second) lead to a sudden downfall of global stock markets.
Another probable cause is the precipitous rise in global debt, which has soared from $142 to $250 trillion since 2008, three times the combined income of every nation. Global markets are running on easy money and credit, leading to a debt build-up which economists from across the political spectrum agree cannot last indefinitely without catastrophic results. The problem is most acute in emerging and developing economies, where short-term capital flowed in response to low interest rates and QE policies in the West. As the US and other rich countries begin to steadily raise interest rates again, there is a risk of a mass exodus of capital from emerging markets that could trigger a renewed debt crisis in the world’s poorest countries.
Of most concern is China, however, whose credit-fuelled expansion in the post-crash years has led to massive over-investment and national debt. With an overheating real-estate sector, volatile stock market and uncontrolled shadow banking system, it is a prime candidate to be the site for the next financial implosion.
However it originates, all the evidence suggests that an economic collapse could be far worse this time around. The ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem remains critical, with the biggest US banks owning more deposits, assets and cash than ever before. And with interest rates at historic lows for many G-10 central banks while the QE taps are still turned on, both developed and developing countries have less policy and fiscal space to respond to another shock.
Above all, China and the US are not in a position to take the same decisive central bank action that helped avert a world depression in 2008. And then there all the contemporary political factors that mitigate against a coordinated international response—the retreat from multilateralism, the disintegration of established geopolitical structures and relationships, the fragmentation and polarisation of political systems throughout the world.
After two years of a US presidency that recklessly scraps global agreements and instigates trade wars, it is hard to imagine a repeat of the G20 gathering in 2009 when assembled leaders pledged never to go down the road of protectionist tariff policies again, fearing a return to the dire economic conditions that led to a world war in the 1930s. The domestic policies of the Trump administration are also especially perturbing, considering its current push for greater deregulation of the financial sector—rolling back the Dodd-Frank and consumer protection acts, increasing the speed of the revolving doorbetween Wall Street and Washington, D.C., and more.
Mobilising from below
None of this should be a reason to despair or lose hope. The great crash has opened up a new awareness and energy for a better society that brings finance under popular control, as a servant to the public and no longer its master. Many different movements and campaigns have sprung up in the post-crash years that focus on addressing the problems wrought by financialisation, which more and more people realise is the underlying source of most of the world’s interlinking crises. All of these developments are hugely important, although the true test of this rising political consciousness will come when the next crash happens.
After the worldwide bank bailouts of 2008-9—estimated in excess of $29 trillion by the US Federal Reserve alone—it is no longer possible to argue that governments cannot afford to provide for the basic necessities of everyone. Just a fraction of that sum would be enough to end income poverty for the 10% of the global population who live on less than $1.90 a day. Not to mention the trillions of dollars, euros, pounds and yen that have been directly pumped into financial markets by central banks of the major developed economies, constituting a regressive form of distribution in favour of the already wealthy that could have been converted into some form of ‘quantitative easing for the people’.
A reversal of government priorities on this scale is clearly not going to be led by the political class. They have already missed the opportunity, and are largely beholden to vested interests that are unduly concerned with short-term profit maximisation, not the rebuilding of the public realm or the universal provision of essential goods and services. The great crash and its aftermath was a global phenomenon that called for a cooperative global response, yet the necessary vision from within the ranks of our governments was woefully lacking. If the financial crisis resurfaces in a different and severer manifestation, we the people will have to fill the vacuum in political leadership. It will call for a monumental mobilisation of citizens from below, focused on a single and unifying demand for a people’s bailout across the world.
Much inspiration can be drawn from the popular uprisings throughout 2011 and 2012, although the Arab Spring and Occupy movements were unable to sustain the momentum for change without a clear agenda that is truly international in scope, and attentive to the needs of the world’s majority poor. That is why we should coalesce our voices around Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims the right of everyone to the minimal requirements for a dignified life—adequate food, housing, medical care, access to social services and financial security.
Through ceaseless demonstrations in all countries that continue day and night, a united call for implementing Article 25 worldwide may finally impel governments to cooperate at the highest level, and rewrite the rules of the international economic system on the basis of shared mutual interests. In the wake of a breakdown of the entire international financial and economic order, such a grassroots mobilisation of numberless people may be the last chance we have of resurrecting long-forgotten proposals in the UN archives, as notably embodied in the aforementioned Brandt Report or Stiglitz Commission.
The case of Iceland is widely remembered as an example of how a people’s bailout can be achieved, following the ‘Pots and Pans Revolution’ that swept the country in 2009—the largest protests in the country’s history to date. As a result of the public’s demands, a new coalition government was able to buck all trends by avoiding austerity measures, actively intervening in capital markets and strengthening social programs for the less privileged. The results were remarkable for Iceland’s economic recovery, which was achieved without forcing society as a whole to pay for the blunders of corrupt banks. Yet it still wasn’t enough to prevent the old establishment political parties from eventually returning to power, and resuming their support for the same neoliberal policies that generated the crisis.
So what must happen if another systemic banking collapse occurs of even greater magnitude, not only in Iceland but in every country of the world? That is the moment when we’ll need a global Pots and Pans Revolution that is replicated by citizens of all nationalities and political persuasions, on and on until the entire planet is engulfed in a wave of peaceful demonstrations with a common cause. It will require a huge resurgence of the goodwill and staying power that once animated Occupy encampments, although this time focused on a more inclusive and universal demandfor implementing Article 25 and sharing the world’s resources.
It may seem far-fetched to presume such an unprecedented awakening of a disillusioned populace, as if we can expect a visionary leader of Christ-like stature to point out the path towards resurrecting the UN’s founding ideals of “better standards of life for everyone in the world”. However nothing less may suffice in this age of economic chaos and confusion, so let us all be prepared for the climactic events about to take place.
*
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This article was originally published on Share The World’s Resources.
Adam Parsons is STWR’s editor and can be contacted at adam@sharing.org.
Featured image is from PragerU.

Albert Edwards: "Equity Investors Are Facing The Four Horsemen Of The Apocalypse"

Even SocGen's Albert Edwards was surprised at how quickly his latest predication was validated.
Recall that 3 weeks ago with the 10Y yield at 3.10%, with Edwards looking at the surge higher in 10Y Yields the SocGen strategist pointed out that the break in the 10y above 2.8% was not the key level that could mark the end of the secular bull market, but rather it was the 3.05% zone as shown in the chart below.
Commenting on this breakout, he said that rates might surge further and addressed whether this would mean the end his "Ice Age" thesis. As he noted, if investors “get the wrong side of a new multi-year bear market in government bonds, all investment  portfolios will be shredded to ribbons as bonds are the cornerstone of most equity valuation models”.
Fast forward to today when in his latest note he writes "let me be totally honest: I was most surprised that the US 10y yield managed to smash through its multi-decade downtrend last week, mainly due to the fact that the CFTC data showed that speculators had already built unprecedented large short positions. It seemed that every man, woman and child was already bearish and so who was left to sell? Well clearly someone was! One thing that helped tip bond prices over the edge and take yields up to 3¼% was the fundamental support from stronger than expected economic data (see chart below). "
Another factor for the latest breakout in yields which pushed the 10Y interest rate to fresh 7 years highs was the previously discussed economic exuberance by Fed Chair Powell who managed to convince markets that they were still too sanguine on their expectations on interest rates, "and the futures strip ratcheted up another notch towards the Fed dots."
The speech last week by Fed Chair Powell was interpreted as unusually upbeat - referring to a remarkably positive outlook for the economy. This contributed to the surge in expectations for further tightening throughout next year. For, although expectations for tightening in the first half of next year had been rising for some time, until very recently this had merely pulled rate hikes forward from H2 to H1. In recent weeks, expectations of more rate hikes have risen sharply in both halves of next year and even spilled into 2020.
Yet while he may have called the short-term move in rates correctly, Edwards is anything but a bond bear. In fact, quite the opposite, and as he notes, "despite the highly significant technical breech of the critical 3.05% long-term secular downtrend, I still stand by my forecast that US 10y yields will go deeply negative in the next recession (to around minus ½-1%)."
I recently reviewed the Global Strategy Weekly of 13 June 2007 when I was at Dresdner Kleinwort (I was not able paste the pdf into this weekly for copyright reasons). Then the remarkably similar and decisive break in the 20-year downtrend of bond yields did not mark the end of the bull market, despite 10y yields breaking above 5.05% and rising to 5¼%.
Edwards than reminisces that as Q3 2007 progressed, "yields slumped towards 4% as the bond market began to sniff the recessionary vapours." And, just like now, equities ignored the signs of course and made new highs in October a few weeks after the Fed’s first rate cut. "But by December, less than six months after the June peak in yields, the US economy had entered the very worst of recessions" Edwards notes, a point he made last month when he laid out the reasons why the next recession "might be only six months away."
As a result, and contrary to conventional wisdom, Edwards continues to think that "recession and a collapse in bond yields is a greater threat to equities than a further push up in yields from this point, especially given the over-extension of speculative

shorts."

Having broken above 3.05%, do not be surprised if this sell-off loses energy.
Maybe, but not today, because even with the disappointing core CPI print, which missed on the biggest plunge in used-car prices in 15 months, the 10Y is already higher than before the number was released.
Having thus concluded his traditionally deflationary view on bonds, Edwards then focuses on Italy, where he highlights one specific chart, which he carries "in my handout while I discuss Italy’'s dire long-term economic situation within the eurozone, which has resulted (unsurprisingly) in a populist backlash. Frankly, I am surprised that it has taken so long to reach this crunch point."
The chart comes from an excellent recent article in Politico magazine. The full article is well worth reading to understand the hostility in Italy towards the EU, particularly among the young. Politico notes, “In countries like France, the U.K., Germany and the Netherlands, polls show a notable generational difference in attitudes toward the EU. Young people tend to feel more positively toward the bloc, while older people tend to hold less favourable opinions. In Italy, the trend is reversed.” Voters under 45 are significantly more likely to vote to leave the EU (51%, compared to 26% over 45), according to a study conducted by Benenson Strategy Group in October 2
To Edwards, this suggests that "the passing of time will only make anti-EU sentiment worse as the older cohort who approve of the EU die" and is the opposite in the UK where Remainers hope a second referendum may change the result purely due to demographic change since the last vote.
In other words, "in Italy time is not a healer. Time is the one thing the pro-EU establishment does not have on its side in Italy."
* * *
So putting it all together, here is Edwards' traditional punchline which, it will come as no surprise to anyone, is of the doom and gloomy variety:
Equity investors are facing the four horsemen of the apocalypse thundering towards them. Out in front leading the charge is the surge in US bond yields, but close on its heels is the escalating trade war and the instability in emerging market currencies. The final but probably most unpredictable horseman is the current faceoff between the Italian government and the European Commission on Italy’s budget deficit.
And in case this was not graphic enough, Edwards also compares what lies in store for equity investors to the fiery death of citizens of Pompei that took place shortly after Vesuvius erupted:
I just can’t seem to escape the financial markets though, because as I saw the cowering skeletal remains in Herculaneum, I was minded of how equity investors might soon feel. They have a big decision to make. Is the eruption in the bond market subsiding? Is it safe to stay in equities and return to normal domesticity, or should they flee?
It’s all very well to say that the victims of Pompeii and Herculaneum should have heeded the warning signs in the weeks leading up to the devastating eruption of 79AD. But equity investors might be ignoring similar early warning signs that the bond market is giving.
“After 12 hours huddled in the beachside boat houses, the refugees from Herculaneum had probably assumed that the worst was over. Vesuvius had been erupting all day and, apart from the hail of pumice, there seemed to be no obvious danger. Yet as the 300 men, women and children sat in the semi-darkness debating whether to return to their homes or flee down the coast, a scorching cloud of superheated volcanic ash burst into the crowded shelters. They were instantly fried alive.”
Edwards' recommendation: when you see a volcano erupt next you, run.
Fonte: qui