9 dicembre forconi: 11/26/18

lunedì 26 novembre 2018

DEMOLITA UN’ALTRA VILLA DEI CASAMONICA. SALVINI FA DIRETTE FACEBOOK A NON FINIRE E SALE SULLA RUSPA


LA REGIONE LAZIO ANNUNCIA CHE AL POSTO DELLA CASA NASCERÀ UN PARCO PUBBLICO, ZINGARETTI PUNGE IL MINISTRO: “NON È UNA PARENTESI PER FARSI FOTOGRAFIE, MA…”

DEMOLIZIONE VILLA DEI CASAMONICA - SALVINI SALE SULLA RUSPA (VIDEO DI SIMONE CANETTIERI/INSTAGRAM)




salvini sulla ruspa per l'abbattimento della villa dei casamonicaSALVINI SULLA RUSPA PER L'ABBATTIMENTO DELLA VILLA DEI CASAMONICA
Casamonica: Salvini sale su ruspa, abbattimento villa

(ANSA) - Caschetto in testa, il ministro dell'Interno Matteo Salvini è salito sulla ruspa dell'Esercito che poi ha cominciato ad abbattere la villa abusiva dei Casamonica alla Romanina, a Roma.

"Ma - ha rassicurato il ministro - non la guidiamo né io né Zingaretti la ruspa, anche se confesso che regolarmente prove di guida le ho fatte sia in montagna che in pianura e quindi ho una seconda professione come demolitore".


Le ruspe ferme davanti alla villa confiscata ai Casamonica in via Roccabernarda alla Romanina che verrà demolita a breve con alle spalle uno spazio allestito per una conferenza stampa con bandiere e sedie per i giornalisti. Tutto è pronto in via Roccabernarda alla Romanina per la demolizione della villa confiscata ai Casmonica. Sul cancello un grosso cartello della Regione Lazio con su scritto: «Qui nascerà un parco pubblico per il quartiere». L'area è presidiata dalle forze dell'ordine e in questi minuti è in corso una bonifica. Attesi il ministro dell'Interno Matteo Salvini e il presidente della Regione Nicola Zingaretti.
salvini alla demolizione della villa dei casamonicaSALVINI ALLA DEMOLIZIONE DELLA VILLA DEI CASAMONICA

Ieri il ministro dell'Interno Matteo Salvini aveva annunciato: «Oggi salirò sulla ruspa, simbolicamente mi piacerebbe farlo perché la gente ha voglia di legalità, ha voglia di regole, ha voglia di sicurezza. Quindi compito del ministro dell'Interno è fare di tutto perché così sia». E oggi Guerino Casamonica, detto Pelé ha replicato: «Salvini? Ben venga, se vuole gli offro anche il caffè. Anzi se vuole glielo porto pure»

villa dei casamonica abbattuta alla romaninaVILLA DEI CASAMONICA ABBATTUTA ALLA ROMANINA






«Non è una parentesi per farsi fotografie, ma è una politica che sta migliorando la vita di tanti quartieri. Abbiamo iniziato tanti anni fa e non ci fermeremo mai», ha aggiunto il presidente della Regione Lazio, Nicola Zingaretti, arrivando a via Roccabernarda. Alla domanda: «Quindi viva la ruspa?» Zingaretti ha risposto: «Viva la rigenerazione della vita dei quartieri e soprattutto delle periferie spesso abbandonate alla criminalità».

Fonte: qui

DOPO 2 ANNI CHIUSA L’INCHIESTA PER LA TRAGEDIA DI RIGOPIANO, 24 PERSONE INDAGATE. “IL COMUNE DI FARINDOLA NON AVREBBE DOVUTO RILASCIARE I PERMESSI EDILIZI PER L’HOTEL”


TRA LE PERSONE CHE RISCHIANO IL PROCESSO CI SONO IL SINDACO E IL PRESIDENTE DELLA PROVINCIA


valanga al rigopianoVALANGA AL RIGOPIANO
"Il Comune di Farindola non avrebbe dovuto rilasciare i permessi edilizi per l'hotel di Rigopiano". Lo si legge nei capi d'imputazione che riguardano dirigenti e politici del Comune. Nel gennaio 2017 morirono 29 persone a causa di una valanga che travolse il resort. Per il pm, il Piano emergenza comunale era "totalmente silente in punto di pericolo di valanghe. Con un nuovo piano regolatore, non sarebbe stato possibile rilasciare i permessi edilizi".

Nel dispositivo di chiusura delle indagini per la tragedia di Rigopiano si legge: "L'assenza della Carta di localizzazione del pericolo da valanga, che se fosse stata emanata avrebbe di necessità individuato nella località stessa in Comune di Farindola un sito esposto a tale pericolo, ha fatto sì che le opere già realizzate dell'hotel Rigopiano a seguito dei permessi di costruire (...) non siano state segnalate dal locale sindaco".
ilario lacchetta sindaco farindolaILARIO LACCHETTA SINDACO FARINDOLA

"Tali informazioni avrebbero determinato l'immediata sospensione di ogni utilizzo nella stagione invernale". La Procura di Pescara quindi conferma che l'hotel era stato costruito su un sito storico di valanga e che l'assenza della Clpv è alla base della tragedia, e che se tutto fosse stato in regola l'hotel sarebbe dovuto stare chiuso almeno durante la stagione nevosa.

rigopiano 3RIGOPIANO 





La Procura di Pescara ha quindi notificato l'avviso di chiusura delle indagini su Rigopiano a 24 persone e una società. Tra le persone che rischiano il processo ci sono il sindaco di Farindola Ilario Lacchetta, il presidente della Provincia, Antonio Di Marco, e il direttore del resort Bruno Di Tommaso che è anche amministratore e legale responsabile della società coinvolta, "Gran Sasso Resort & spa". Indagato anche l'ex prefetto di Pescara, Francesco Provolo, che insieme ad altri due ex dirigenti avrebbe attivato in ritardo le procedure indispensabili per liberare in sicurezza l'albergo prima della valanga.
RIGOPIANO RIFUGIORIGOPIANO RIFUGIO

Le accuse, a seconda delle posizioni, vanno dall'abuso d'ufficio, falso, e abusi edilizi, fino al disastro e omicidio colposi. La tragedia risale al 18 gennaio 2017 quando una valanga distrusse l'hotel provocando 29 morti. Il giorno prima della tragedia, decine di persone erano rimaste bloccate a causa della nevicata che aveva interrotto l'unica strada percorribile per il paese: spaventate e infreddolite aspettavano da ore i soccorsi quando la slavina distrusse tutto senza lasciar scampo, intrappolando, e uccidendo.

Fonte: qui

JPMorgan Spots The Next Big Problem: A Plunge In Global Bond Demand

One year ago, just as the Fed had started quantitative tightening, i.e., the shrinkage of its balance sheet, JPMorgan's Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou, author of the popular Flows and Liquidity newsletter predicted that the more than $1 trillion decline in G4 central bank bond purchases in 2018 relative to 2017 would be a key driver for the change in the overall supply/demand balance for government bonds, and result in broadly higher yields across the board. And sure enough, with the 10Y rising from 2.33% one year ago to a multi-year high of 3.24% earlier this month, as government bonds around the globe also saw a material pickup in yields, that prediction has been proven accurate.
Where JPM was wrong was in its estimates for matched pickup in non-central bank demand for government paper, where as Panigirtzoglou admits, he was overly optimistic (more on that shortly). 
So with traders - across all asset classes, including equity, credit and rates, all focusing on what happens to US Treasury yields next, the JPMorgan strategist revisits his previous analysis on global bond demand and supply, incorporating updated supply forecasts both for the balance of 2018 as well as for 2019.
"Given this year has seen the largest increase in excess supply of bonds since 2010, which as we noted last week has together with continued Fed hikes contributed to a tightening in financial conditions that has been reverberating across markets, there has been considerable interest in how next year is shaping up."
Attention on 2019 is especially acute as the Fed’s balance sheet normalization process is set to accelerate given that it is only in 4Q18 that the monthly cap for the quantity of maturing bonds that are allowed to roll off has reached its steady state of $50Bn/month, which unlike 2018 when QT was just starting, will induce a further increase in net supply that needs to be absorbed by the market of more than $100bn.
It's not just the Fed: with the ECB set to end its QE purchases in December this year and we see the BoJ continuing its gradual slowdown in bond purchases to ¥30tr in 2019 compared to around ¥40tr this year, JPMorgan notes that this collective shrinkage of the G-4 balance sheet means that the market needs to absorb a further decrease in price-insensitive QE demand of more than $400bn next year.
Here's the bad news: adding together both the supply and demand side impact, the G4 central bank flow looks set to decline a further $550bn next year.
Which begs the question: will there be an incremental increase in demand to offset this dramatic net increase in supply in the coming year? JPMorgan answer is hardly what bond bulls are looking for...
To answer the key question for interest rates in 2019, here is what JPMorgan sees in terms of potential offsetting sources of demand to this continued change in central bank flow, which has clearly put upward pressure on bond yields in 2018.
Commercial Bank Demand.
This is the biggest source of demand disappointment in 2018. According to Panigirtzoglou, he had expected G4 commercial banks to offset some $500bn of the more than $1tr shift in the central bank flow this year. This was based on an estimate that the $7tr of QE purchases by G4 central banks in the prior five years had seen commercial banks accumulate around $3tr less bonds than they would accumulated if QE had not happened. However, the bank's latest estimate of G4 bank bond demand for 2018 suggests they offset only around $200bn of the central bank QE flow shift, "or a multiplier of around 0.2 rather than slightly more than 0.4 we had expected", according to the Flows and Liquidity author.
As the primary reason for this weakness in demand relative to his baseline expectations, the JPM strategist notes the fact that US banks have ceased accumulating excess deposits in 2018 (Figure 2), reducing the need to increase holdings of liquid assets.
Moreover, US banks’ growth in total assets effectively ground to a halt this year for the first time since 2010. Furthermore, US banks appeared to have more than adequate HQLA to absorb some reduction in reserve holdings before needing to accumulate further liquid assets. That said, with front-end Treasuries having cheapened significantly relative to OIS, this has increased their attractiveness for banks to hold as HQLA for regulatory purposes.
Additionally, given the continued decline in the G4 central bank flow, the bank sees G4 commercial banks providing some offset to this decline next year also.
However, given the weakness in this offset this year, we adopt the more modest 0.2x multiplier as a conservative estimate, which  gives us an improvement in commercial bank demand of around $100bn in 2019.
Unfortunately that is not nearly enough to offset the big jump in net supply, which brings us to the second biggest source of potential incremental demand, namely...
Retail bond demand
Here too, and similar to its optimistic commercial bank demand forecast, retail bond demand saw the largest deterioration relative to JPM's expectations for this year. Following on from last year’s more than $800bn of bond demand, JPMorgan had expected a relatively little changed demand backdrop for this year. But following a very strong inflow in January, bond demand after the equity market correction in Jan/Feb has been very modest and is currently tracking a $320bn annualized pace for 2018.  This pace was as weak as 2015 and over the past 10 years only 2011 and 2013 have seen weaker bond demand numbers. Similar to 2016, the bank expects some recovery in 2019 demand from this year’s weakness, but pencil in a relatively conservative improvement in bond demand of around $80bn, or around halfway towards the average annual bond demand over the past decade of around $480bn.
So with the two traditionally largest sources of bond demand - commercial banks and retail investors - set for further disappointment, that brings us to the third potential "Hail Mary" for bond demand in 2019..
Foreign Official Demand
As we discussed in recent weeks, and in keeping with the demand drift for the above two categories, EM reserve growth has weakened in the second half of the year relative to the $230bn annualized pace that IMF data suggested for the first half. Indeed, JPM's estimate of EM FX reserve growth in the second half up to end-October - perhaps in part due to the recent plunge in oil prices which have a direct impact on reciprocal demand for Treasuries in the petrodollar recycling pathway - is for a modest reduction of around $15bn, which brings down the annualized pace of reserve growth to $130bn in 2018 or around $100bn lower than last year.
In addition to the impact of oil prices, this decline in reserves has been driven primarily by China, where the PBoC has likely been intervening to smooth the path of CNY depreciation. Given US-China trade tensions are likely to persist into next year and most analysts expect depreciation pressures on the currency to continue, JPMorgan sees little prospect for a meaningful pickup in bond demand from reserve accumulation to offset the decline in G4 central bank demand and project 2019 bond demand unchanged at $130bn.
Pensions Fund Demand
With 3 of the 4 top demand categories set to disappoint, one potential wildcard is pension fund demand. 
First, as JPM notes, it currently only has data for G4 pension fund demand from the various central banks’ flow of funds publications up to 2Q18, which suggests aggregate demand of at a $700bn annualized pace. This is modestly higher than it had expected at the start of the year and reflects in particular strong demand by US pension funds, where the significant improvement in the funded status of private defined benefit pension funds was driven primarily by increases in the interest rates used to discount future liabilities. Indeed, the yield to worst on the Bloomberg US corporate long Aa index rose by just over 80bp during the year up to end-October, and the Milliman data on the 100 largest defined benefit pension plans showed an improvement in the funded status as a result of a decline in the value of liabilities of more than 7% even as asset returns were also modestly negative at -2% as a result of the October correction.
The improvement in the funded ratios creates an incentive for these pension funds to increase allocations to bonds to lock in this improvement. To Panigirtzoglou, this means that demand from pension funds and insurance companies will remain supportive in 2019, although even here the strategist factors in some modest mean reversion from this year’s $700bn annualized pace to around $600bn next year, which is still above the average annual demand over the past 10 years of around $500bn.
Putting it all together...
Consolidating these different influences on global bond demand, including the decline in net purchases by the BoJ and ECB as well as the modest offsets from other bond investors outlined above, JPMorgan now expects a further significant reduction in bond demand next year of around $350 billion. In fact, as shown in the chart below, summing across the five main sources of bond demand suggests that in 2019 consolidated bond demand will be the lowest it has been since 2008, just as the Fed was set to launch QE, and send both interest rates and yields down to record lows.
Meanwhile, on the bond supply side, JPMorgan expects a modest aggregate increase in both DM government and spread product issuance. For US Treasuries, the bank sees around $160bn of increase in net issuance, including the effect of an expanded fiscal deficit as well as the increase in Fed balance sheet normalisation, while for other DM government bonds it sees a modest decrease driven mainly by a reduction in Euro area government bond issuance. On aggregate, JPM expects net global bond supply to increase by approximately $130 billion.
Putting it all together, the combination of a $350bn deterioration in bond demand and a $130bn increase in bond supply leaves Panigirtzoglou concerned about the net deterioration in the bond supply/demand balance of around $480bn in 2019, compared to around $830bn this year.
Some final cautionary observations:
We note that the 2018 deterioration in the balance between bond demand and supply shown in Figure 9 is much higher compared to our projections from a year ago, as at the time we had overestimated the demand of not only retail investors, which was our biggest forecast error, but also of FX reserve managers and commercial banks.
Summing it all up, the largest US bank warns that "the continued deterioration in the bond supply/demand balance we expect for next year looks set to put further upside pressure on yields in 2019."
And since it was the gradual at first, then suddenly sharp spike in US yields that catalyzed the stock market slump in October, that has since affected November returns as well, traders will be especially focused on JPMorgan's assessment for 2019's net demand shortfall, because if accurate it would suggest that the only way demand will emerge is if yield reprice materially higher, together with all the adverse side effects for all other risk products.
Fonte: qui

Thoughts From The Precipice

Things are worsening. But we're not over the edge quite yet.

Why Italy’s economy is stagnating



Leading economists tell the FT why the government’s budget is not the solution

Why is Italy’s economy so sickly and has the country’s new government found the cure for its economic ills? 
As Rome locks horns with Brussels over a draft Italian budget that the European Commission has rejected for breaching EU rules, the Financial Times has consulted leading economists, academics and industrialists about the root causes of the country’s sluggish growth. 
The experts’ answers, ranging from corporate culture to public debt, provide little backing for the Italian government’s case that its plans to increase the fiscal deficit to up to 2.4 per cent of gross domestic product will kick-start growth after years of poor performance. 

THE DEPTHS OF ITALY’S PROBLEM 
The challenge facing the Italian government is to get Italy out of the slow or no-growth trap it has been caught in throughout this century. 
Growth has stalled, leaving the country’s economic output still 5 per cent below its pre-crisis peak of 2008. 
Italy and Greece are now the only EU countries that have failed to recover to the levels of 10 years ago. 
But Rome’s problems go even deeper than this: 
GDP per capita is today, when adjusted for inflation, less than in 2000. 
The data highlight the country’s mediocre economic performance since the introduction of the euro in 1999-2002. 
Eurosceptics, some of whom are close to Italy’s populist coalition government, often blame the single currency for the economy’s ills, arguing that devaluation could kick-start exports. 
But the broad consensus among economists is that the country’s problems are due to structural weaknesses, rather than the euro. 
So why has economic performance been so poor? 
Here are the findings of the experts consulted by the FT, beginning with the most frequently mentioned possible causes.




INDUSTRIAL MODERNISATION — OR LACK OF IT 
Italy’s economic model is very dependent on family-owned companies that are typically smaller and less productive than their equivalents elsewhere. 
This problem has grown worse in recent decades. “In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Italian business model of small and medium-sized enterprises drove growth,” Silvia Ardagna, economist at Goldman Sachs, said. 
But, she added, many of those companies “did not invest in R&D and lacked the management capabilities and human capital to allow them to compete on a global scale”. 
According to the European Commission’s SME tracker, 95 per cent of Italy’s businesses have fewer than 10 employees. 
OECD data show Italian companies of that size have lower levels of labour productivity than their peers.




Bigger companies also fail to innovate, whether because of traditional, change-resistant, family ownership or difficulty obtaining credit. 
The latest OECD economic survey of Italy showed that contrary to the experience of most of the organisation’s member states, productivity among the most efficient companies in Italy is declining even faster than among the least productive ones. 






Despite a government initiative in 2016 to encourage companies to increase their digital presence, fewer than one in 10 non-financial businesses in Italy sells online. 
This is the third-lowest share in the EU after Romania and Bulgaria, according to Eurostat, the bloc’s statistical agency. 
The Italian government’s draft budget allocates very limited resources for dealing with such issues, planning no increase in the funds available to help companies with digital transformation for 2019 and only a minimal rise in 2020.  

POOR EDUCATION SYSTEM 
The experts cited Italy’s dysfunctional educational system as second only to the problems with business culture and industrial modernisation. 
“The highly centralised and unionised educational system delivers poor results in terms of actual skills,” said Massimo Bassetti, an economist at FocusEconomics.  
Fewer than one in three 25-34-year-old Italians has a university degree, well below the 44 per cent OECD average. 
Italian 15-year-olds have lower maths, science and reading performances than most of their peers, according to the OECD PISA report. 




Italy also has one of the highest student dropout rates in the OECD, and about one in four Italians aged 15-34 are neither in work nor education, the largest proportion in the EU. 





Italy’s budget plan contains reforms such as expanding pre-school education, changing teacher recruitment and reducing dropouts from school, but they are not among measures receiving significant additional funds.

UNFRIENDLY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Italy scores poorly on most measures of government efficiency and satisfaction with public services.  
The country ranks 111th out of 190 countries globally for ease of enforcing contracts, according to the World Bank ease-of-doing-business index. 
Italy scores just as poorly on bureaucracy for resolving insolvencies, paying taxes and dealing with construction permits. 
The country’s civil justice system is also ranked second to last among 35 high-income countries as measured by the World Justice Project.




“In Italy it takes far longer than in other developed countries to conclude civil and criminal trials,” with consequence for the business environment, said Mauro Pisu, senior economist at the OECD. 
“Inefficient public administration effectively acts as an additional cost on businesses, holding back investment and growth,” said Ms Ardagna. “Italy’s complex tax code, Byzantine regulation and inefficient public administration” are a “handicap”, said Mr Bassetti. 
They also prevent foreign companies from investing in Italy, said Andrea Colli, professor of business history at Bocconi University. Italy is a larger economy than Spain but has received less than half the level of foreign greenfield investment since 2003, according to fDi Markets.




In his letter to Brussels, Giovanni Tria, Italy’s minister of finance, wrote that future structural reforms, including the reform of the Civil Code, would “stimulate economic growth, ensuring the long-term sustainability of Italy’s public finances”.  

HIGH PUBLIC DEBT 
Italy’s coalition government argues that its spending plans will help fuel growth. 
But many of the experts consulted by the FT argue the contrary: that high debt levels already crowd out growth by attracting funds for government paper that would otherwise go towards more productive investments. 
“High public debt has limited the resources that have been devoted to the productive sector of the economy,” said Ms Ardagna.  
With the EU’s second-highest debt-to-GDP ratio, Italy spent 3.7 per cent of its GDP on debt interest, double the average of the EU. 
The European Commission’s latest forecast expects this to rise to 3.9 per cent by 2020 as a result of higher bond yields and interest rates.  
“Italy’s debt burden absorbs substantial financing resources, reducing funds for infrastructure investment and crowding out business investment,” said Mr Bassetti. 




While under the draft budget Italy will allocate additional funding of 0.2 per cent of GDP to public investment in 2019 and 0.3 per cent in 2020, analysts are not expecting significant improvement in its overall structural weaknesses. 
“Our baseline scenario remains that the new government won’t give the economy the needed reform push to jolt productivity,” Nicola Nobile, economist at Oxford Economics, said.

Fonte: qui