9 dicembre forconi: 09/11/18

martedì 11 settembre 2018

Non è tutto oro (nero) quello che luccica, il miracolo Usa del petrolio si esaurirà in fetta


Lo chiamano il miracolo dello ”shale oil”. In Texas si preparano a produrre più petrolio che in Iran. Ma attraverso tecniche costose come il fracking, e con nessuna sicurezza sulla durata della produzione


Da alcune settimane i media americani evidenziano i record raggiunti dalla produzione nazionale di petrolio. La notizia è che gli USA si avviano ad esportare più petrolio di quello che consumano pur essendo la nazione più ricca del pianeta. Tutti i media sottolineano che il Texas arriverà a produrre addirittura più greggio dell’Iran o dell’Iraq e che – se lo considerassimo come una nazione indipendente – diventerebbe il terzo produttore di petrolio al mondo. Ma da dove salta fuori quello che è già stato battezzato lo shale miracle, il miracolo dello shale, cioè della roccia? Per capirlo dobbiamo fare un passo indietro.
Lo “shale oil” - detto più propriamente “tight oil” - è il petrolio contenuto in matrici rocciose a bassa permeabilità. Sono fanghi e sedimenti argillosi formati in superficie ma poi trasportati in profondità dai movimenti geologici nel corso di milioni di anni. Se questi fanghi sepolti sono ricchi di materia organica, questa si decompone in assenza di ossigeno e – sempre nel corso di milioni di anni – dà origine a petrolio e gas che rimane intrappolato all’interno di una roccia estremamente poco porosa. La scarsa porosità è proprio quella che rende difficile l’estrazione con metodi convenzionali.
Per questo è necessario usare tecniche di sfruttamento particolari, come la fratturazione idraulica, meglio nota come “fracking”. In pratica, si aumenta la permeabilità del giacimento - e quindi la possibilità di estrarre gli idrocarburi che contiene – iniettando dentro i pozzi di trivellazione acqua ad alta pressione. Questa fa letteralmente scoppiare la roccia: produce fratture che si propagano all’interno della matrice argillosa creando, così, una rete di minuscoli percorsi dove passeranno le goccioline di petrolio e di gas per raggiungere il pozzo perforato ed essere così estratte. Per evitare che la roccia si richiuda dopo la fratturazione, all’acqua iniettata si aggiungono delle sabbie quarzose con granuli di dimensioni ben precise che si incastrano nelle crepe appena formate e impediscono a queste di richiudersi ermeticamente subito dopo.

La prima tecnologia di fracking - ora sviluppata ed estesa in tutto il mondo - è stata brevettata nel 1949
 proprio per estrarre shale oil da alcuni giacimenti texani che prima non potevano essere sfruttati. Ma tirare fuori petrolio da questi giacimenti argillosi costa molto di più che estrarlo dai comuni (e più comodi) giacimenti ad alta porosità, dove il petrolio o il gas possono essere pompati fuori senza adottare tecniche così sofisticate. Per questo, gli Stati Uniti hanno scatenato la produzione di shale oil & gas proprio nel 2013-2014, quando il barile era ad oltre 100 $, per poi doverla drasticamente ridurre col crollo del prezzo del greggio degli anni successivi.
Infatti, mentre in Arabia Saudita, in Iran e in Iraq il costo di estrazione è inferiore a 10 $ al barile, estrarre lo shale oil degli USA costa più di 24 $ al barile. E se consideriamo i costi operativi, quelli di realizzazione degli impianti, le tasse, i costi di trasporto e raffinazione, i margini di guadagno per le compagnie si riducono all’osso o possono tramutarsi in perdite secche. Negli ultimi mesi, il nuovo aumento del prezzo del barile di greggio (che ora si aggira fra i 70 e gli 80 $) e l’introduzione di tecniche di fracking sempre più perfezionate ed economiche, ha permesso quello shale miracle che nessuno riteneva possibile anche solo 10 anni fa. Il risultato è che gli Stati Uniti producono più di 10 milioni di barili di petrolio al giorno per la prima volta dagli anni ’70.

Il risultato è che, mentre un giacimento convenzionale può essere sfruttato anche per decenni in modo economicamente vantaggioso, nei giacimenti a shale circa l’80% degli idrocarburi disponibili vengono già estratti nei primi due anni.

dati ufficiali EIA su cui gongolano tutti i commentatori americani, dicono che il divario tra importazioni di petrolio ed esportazioni si è ridotto a 6,8 milioni di barili al giorno nel 2017, il minimo storico da 24 anni in qua. Anche se oggi l'economia americana è in crescita, a maggio 2018 le importazioni USA di petrolio sono scese a 7,8 milioni di barili al giorno, mentre a metà 2012 erano sopra i 9 milioni di barili al giorno. 

Ma non è tutto oro (nero) quello che luccica
. Innanzi tutto, è evidente che gli Stati Uniti stanno ancora importando 7,8 milioni di barili al giorno, poco meno dei 10 che producono. Perciò, per diventare energeticamente autonomi, gli americani dovrebbero arrivare a produrre dai loro pozzi nell’argilla texana quasi il doppio del greggio che ne estraggono oggi.
Ma esiste un secondo fattore oggi ancora poco considerato. Queste previsioni si basano sull’assunzione che i giacimenti shale produrranno volumi di petrolio sempre più grandi.
Purtroppo però, i giacimenti a bassa permeabilità mostrano una storia di produzione ben diversa dai giacimenti convenzionali. Tutte le risorse limitate seguono una curva di produzione che assomiglia a una campana e prende il nome di Curva di Hubbert. Ne parliamo in dettaglio qui proprio a proposito delle risorse fossili.Ogni risorsa ha una sua curva caratteristica le cui dimensioni, sia in altezza (intensità di produzione) che in larghezza (tempo) sono funzione di numerosi parametri. Fra questi ci sono il costo di produzione e il prezzo di vendita, la disponibilità e l’accessibilità della risorsa e il suo quantitativo totale. Mentre le curve del petrolio e del gas convenzionali sono piuttosto ampie (e questo significa che la crescita iniziale, il picco e la decrescita finale si sviluppano su scale più che decennali) lo sfruttamento dei giacimenti di shale segue curve molto più ristrette, dovute principalmente alla pur sempre limitata efficacia delle tecniche di fratturazione idraulica se confrontate ai comodi metodi di estrazione dai giacimenti tradizionali.

Il risultato è che, mentre un giacimento convenzionale può essere sfruttato anche per decenni in modo economicamente vantaggioso, nei giacimenti a shale circa l’80% degli idrocarburi disponibili vengono già estratti nei primi due anni. Per compensare, si devono scavare altri pozzi nello stesso giacimento e usare di nuovo il fracking per sbloccare gli idrocarburi che ancora contiene e mantenere la produzione a regime. Il fenomeno, ben noto da anni, si chiama sindrome della regina di cuori e prende il nome dalla carta da gioco che, nel romanzo di Lewis Carroll, dice ad Alice: “devi correre più forte che puoi se vuoi rimanere nello stesso posto”. Puntualmente, infatti, i costi lievitano così rapidamente che conviene abbandonare il giacimento e andare a scavare da un’altra parte.

La curva che rappresenta il totale della produzione è il risultato della somma di tutte le curve di produzione dei singoli giacimenti o, se vogliamo, dei singoli pozzi. Perciò, mentre la curva del petrolio convenzionale è in ascesa da decenni - e in questo articolo cerchiamo di analizzare quando si raggiungerà il picco - la corrispondente curva per lo shale è molto più ristretta.

Il rapido esaurimento intrinseco a tutti i giacimenti a shale fa sì che presto vengano esauriti quelli più facili da sfruttare e ci si riduca a produrre petrolio e gas da quelli dove i costi di estrazione sono più alti e la quantità estraibile è minore. Come previsto, la produzione dai principali giacimenti americani - in particolare Eagle Ford e Bakken - sta diminuendo sensibilmente dai rispettivi picchi raggiunti solo nel 2015. Anche il Permian (il più grosso, si estende sotto il Texas occidentale e Nuovo Messico) sembra prossimo a raggiungere il suo picco.

Un ultimo fattore da prendere in esame è la stima di quanto petrolio si possa estrarre da un dato giacimento di qualsiasi natura. Sui banchi universitari, l’Ingegner Giuseppe Bello era solito ripeterci che “sai quanto olio puoi estrarre da un giacimento solo quando lo avrai estratto tutto”.

Le compagine energetiche tendono ad essere un po’ di manica larga nelle stime dei giacimenti a loro disposizione, perché questo aiuta gli azionisti ad avere fiducia nelle compagnie stesse. Ma anche le tecniche per effettuare le previsioni hanno fatto notevoli passi avanti negli ultimi dieci anni. Il risultato è che anche le stime più rosee spesso devono venir corrette al ribasso, come nei casi clamorosi del giacimento Utica e in quello Monterrey. Per quest’ultimo le previsioni iniziali sono state tagliate di ben il 96% in poche ore!

Oggi, le rinnovabili non sono ancora in grado di soppiantare carbone, petrolio e gas e la quasi totalità degli Stati del mondo soddisfa la propria domanda di energia soprattutto con questi tre combustibili fossili, nonostante tutti i problemi di inquinamento. Anche in futuro, la domanda aumenterà, come prevede il recente studio Prospettiva per l’energia, proiezione al 2040 della Exxon.

Vi si legge che la produzione complessiva di petrolio convenzionale continuerà a diminuire, ma l’aumento di domanda dovrà essere soddisfatto dall’aumento dei giacimenti non convenzionali, primi fra tutti proprio quelli a shale. Ma abbiamo appena visto che questi giacimenti si esauriscono molto più rapidamente degli altri, che estrarre petrolio o gas da giacimenti a shale sempre peggiori costa sempre di più nonostante il miglioramento delle tecnologie di fracking e, infine, che gli idrocarburi che vi si trovano intrappolati potrebbero essere molto più scarsi di quello che pensiamo. Ecco alcuni punti su cui riflettere quando pensiamo al nostro futuro energetico. Gli americani se ne stanno già accorgendo. Meglio investire sulla ricerca e lo sviluppo di nuove fonti rinnovabili. E fare presto.

Fonte: qui

PS: In Italia non ci sono giacimenti a shale. Almeno per la sindrome della regina di cuori non abbiamo bisogno di vaccini.

Fed Should Buy Stocks In The Next Recession: Former IMF Chief Economist

Our economy’s journey to becoming Japan will take one giant step forward if former IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard has his way. His "outside the box" solution for our next recession? The Fed should buy stocks, finance the federal deficit and buy goods. He detailed this thought provoking idea at the Boston Fed’s monetary policy conference that took place this past weekend.
This thinking comes as a result of a "general sense [that] the Fed has to re-think its approach to combating recessions," according to a new MarketWatch article.
Why must it re-think its approach? Because the Fed itself has eliminated most of its tools used to fight recessions by keeping the United States in a lower interest rate environment for too long, instead of raising rates as the market roared. Now we have a stock market at all time highs and record debt levels yet again - but this time with a Federal Reserve that has far fewer options to combat the next recession than it ever has had in the past and with a neutral rate of interest that is lower than it has ever been in the past.
Fascinatingly enough, economists are only now starting to realize that this lack of firepower could be a detriment to the Federal Reserve in the future. Blanchard stated over the weekend that the Fed could probably handle a small recession, but a more major recession, like the one we experienced in 2008, should prompt the Fed to resort to "previously unheard of policies".
When interviewed by MarketWatch, Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren stated that he wasn’t sure there would be support for this type of monetary policy, as Blanchard was describing it. We'd be interested in revisiting his answer in the midst of a crisis. 
Rosengren went on to say "We definitely have tools. The question is whether we have the sharpest tool in the shed and whether we’re going to be able to deploy them."
Allow us to be the first to guess that they do not have "the sharpest tools in the shed", in more ways than one. 
Apparently convinced that two wrongs do in fact make a right, Rosengren then stated he would be "a strong advocate" of QE the way that we know it best: asset purchases and rate cuts. Such a cavalier attitude about this type of damaging monetary policy belies the larger problem of the Fed's balance sheet, which stands at over $4 trillion with no signs of lightning up in any material way.
But Blanchard doesn’t seem to think that this $4 trillion dollar balance sheet is even a problem. "If we need it, we could clearly double it and nothing terrible would happen," Blanchard reportedly said.
He concludes that he is not sure why people believe the Fed should only buy assets, but not goods.
“We have this notion that it is only OK for the central bank to buy assets and not goods. But that’s a restriction we imposed on ourselves,” Blanchard is quoted as saying.
Yes, how bizarre that the Fed doesn't buy, say, baseball cards to boost the "wealth effect" at the card collector level, or maybe Tesla Model 3s, just because.
Of course, Neither Blanchard nor Rosengren seem to realize that the reason we are in a place where central banks had to buy $15 trillion in assets to begin with is because the Fed and this type of thinking has put us in to begin with. What will this discussion look like in another 10 years, after the next crisis? We don’t know, though we are sure every problem we'll be dealing with by then will be exactly what we deserve. Fonte: qui

US Consumer Credit Hits All Time High As Credit Card Usage Stalls


Two months after a near record surge in consumer credit driven by a spike in credit card debt, the US consumer went into a period hibernation to start the summer, when total consumer credit rose by just $8.5 billion in June, with revolving, or credit card debt posting only its second contraction since 2013. Then moments ago, the Fed reported that in July, consumer credit posted a solid rebound, rising by $16.6 billion, above the $14.4 billion expected, and bringing the total to $3.92 trillion, a 5.1% annualized increase from a year ago, and a new all time high.
Of this increase, the bulk was from non-revolving credit, or auto and student loans, which rose by $15.4 billion to a new record high of $3.92 trillion, while revolving, or credit card, debt posted a minimal $1.3 billion increase, barely offsetting the June decline, if enough to also bring the total revolving credit to a new all time high of $1.04 trillion.
In other words, while Americans continue to spend on cars and college, they were far less enthusiastic about charging everyday purchases on their credit cards.
And while the recent flatlining in credit card debt will prompt questions about the resilience of the US consumer during the summer, the recent dramatic upward revision to personal savings notwithstanding, one place where there were no surprises, was in the total amount of student and auto loans: here as expected, both numbers were at fresh all time highs, with a record $1.532 trillion in student loans outstanding, an increase of $8 billion in the quarter, auto debt also hit a new all time high of $1.131 trillion, an increase of $18 billion in the quarter. Fonte: qui

The Money Game & The Human Brain

Jason Zweig, a neuroscience and Benjamin Graham expert, re-published an article last year entitled: “Ben Graham, The Human Brain, And The Bubble.” The entire article is a worthy read but there were a few points in particular he made that are just as relevant today as they were when he wrote the original essay in 2003.
“At the peak of every boom and in the trough of every bust, Benjamin Graham‘s immortal warning is validated yet again: ‘The investor’s chief problem — and even his worst enemy — is likely to be himself.'” 
I have written about the psychological issues which impede investors returns over longer-term time frames in the past. They aren’t just psychological, but also financial. To wit:
“Another common misconception is that everyone MUST be saving in their 401k plans through automated contributions. According to Vanguard’s recent survey, not so much.
  • The average account balance is $103,866 which is skewed by a small number of large accounts.
  • The median account balance is $26,331
  • From 2008 through 2017 the average inflation-adjusted gain was just 28%. 
So, what happened?
  • Why aren’t those 401k balances brimming over with wealth?
  • Why aren’t those personal E*Trade and Schwab accounts bursting at the seams?
  • Why are so many people over the age of 60 still working?
While we previously covered the impact of market cycles, the importance of limiting losses, the role of starting valuations, and the proper way to think about benchmarking your portfolio, the two biggest factors which lead to chronic investor underperformance over time are:
  • Lack of capital to invest, and;
  • Psychological behaviors
Psychological factors account for fully 50% of investor shortfalls in the investing process. It is also difficult to ‘invest’ when the majority of Americans have an inability to ‘save.'”
“These factors, as shown by data from Dalbar, lead to the lag in performance between investors and the markets over all time periods.”
While “buy and hold” and “dollar cost averaging” sound great in theory, the actual application is an entirely different matter. Ultimately, as individuals, we do everything backwards. We “buy” when market exuberance is at its peak and asset prices are overvalued, and we “sell” when valuations are cheap and there is a “rush for the exits.” 
Behavioral biases are an issue which remains little understood and accounted for when individuals begin their investing journey. Dalbar defined (9) nine of these behavioral biases specifically:
  • Loss Aversion – The fear of loss leads to a withdrawal of capital at the worst possible time.  Also known as “panic selling.”
  • Narrow Framing – Making decisions about on part of the portfolio without considering the effects on the total.
  • Anchoring – The process of remaining focused on what happened previously and not adapting to a changing market.
  • Mental Accounting – Separating performance of investments mentally to justify success and failure.
  • Lack of Diversification – Believing a portfolio is diversified when in fact it is a highly correlated pool of assets.
  • Herding– Following what everyone else is doing. Leads to “buy high/sell low.”
  • Regret – Not performing a necessary action due to the regret of a previous failure.
  • Media Response – The media has a bias to optimism to sell products from advertisers and attract view/readership.
  • Optimism – Overly optimistic assumptions tend to lead to rather dramatic reversions when met with reality.
Cognitive biases impairs our ability to remain emotionally disconnected from our money.
But it isn’t entirely your fault. The Wall Street marketing machine, through effective use of media, have changed our view of investing from a “process to grow savings over time” to a “get rich quick scheme” to offset the shortfall in savings. Why “save” money when the market will “make you rich?”
Using faulty assumptions is the linchpin to the inability to meet future obligations. By over-estimating future returns, future retirement values are artificially inflated which reduces the required saving amounts need by individuals today. Such also explains why 8-out-of-10 American’s are woefully underfunded for retirement currently.”

The Illusion Of Control

Jason discussed another important psychological barrier to our success.
Online trading firms went further, blowing the traditional brokerage model to bits. With no physical branch offices, no in-house research, no investment banking, and no brokers, they had only one thing to offer their customers: the ability to trade at will, without the counterweight of any second opinion or expert advice. Once, that degree of freedom might have frightened investors. But the new Internet brokerages cleverly fostered what psychologists call ‘the illusion of control’ — the belief that you are at your safest in an automobile when you are the driver. Investors were encouraged to believe that the magnitude of their portfolio’s return would be directly proportional to the amount of attention they paid to it — and that professional advice would reduce their return.”
The “illusion of control,” is another behavioral bias that individuals regularly face. When stock prices are rising, especially in a momentum-driven market, individuals believe that have it “all figured out.” The inherent problems which arise from this “over-confidence” are the layering of “risks” in portfolios which are misunderstood until a correction process begins. As I wrote previously:
“Bull markets hide investing mistakes, bear markets reveal them.” 
The reality is that as individuals we are NOT investors, but rather just speculators hoping the share of stock we purchased today, will be able to be sold at a higher price later. Unfortunately, since individuals are told to “buy,” but never “sell,” only one-half of the investment process is completed.
In other words, the illusion we are in “control” is simply that. Logically, we know we should “buy low” and “sell high.”Yet it is the entirety of our other behavioral biases that keep us from doing so. But most importantly, it is the consistent message from the mainstream media which “feeds our greed” that asset prices will only move higher…and you surely don’t want to miss out on that.

The Video Game 

Another risk Jason points out is our “addiction.”
“Psychologist Marvin Zuckerman at the University of Delaware has written about a form of risk called ‘sensation-seeking’ behavior. This kind of risk — people daring each other to push past the boundaries of normally acceptable behavior — is largely a group phenomenon (as anyone who has ever been a teenager knows perfectly well). People will do things in a social group that they would never dream of doing in isolation.”
As individuals, we are “addicted” to the “dopamine effect.” It is why social media has become so ingrained in society today as individuals constantly look to see how many likes, shares, retweets, or comments they have received. That instant gratification and acknowledgment keep us glued to our screens and less involved in the world around us.
We are addicted.
As Jason notes, a team of researchers have proved this point:
“Wolfram Schultz at Cambridge and Read Montague at Baylor in Houston, Texas, have shown that the release of dopamine, the brain chemical that gives you a ‘natural high,’ is triggered by financial gains. The less likely or predictable the gain is, the more dopamine is released and the longer it lasts within the brain. Why do investors and gamblers love taking low-probability bets with high potential payoffs? Because, if those bets dopay off, they produce an actual physiological change — a massive release of dopamine that floods the brain with a soft euphoria.
After a few successful predictions of financial gain, speculators literally become addicted to the release of dopamine within their own brains. Once a few trades pay off, they cannot stop the craving for another ‘fix’ of profits — any more than an alcoholic or a drug abuser can stop craving the bottle or the needle.”
Fortunately, we have support groups to help with most of our addictions from alcohol to gambling. While these groups are there to help us curb our addictive and destructive behaviors for some things, the investing world is full of groups which exist to “feed” our investing addiction.
“Until the advent of the Internet, there was simply no such thing as a network or support group for risk-crazed retail traders. Now, quite suddenly, there was — and with every gain each of them scored, they goaded the other members of the group on to take even more risk. Comments like ‘PRICE IS NO OBJECT’ and ‘BUY THE NEXT MICROSOFT BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE’ and ‘I’LL BE ABLE TO RETIRE NEXT WEEK’ became commonplace.
And the public was urged to hurry. ‘EVERY SECOND COUNTS,’ went the slogan of Fidelity’s discount brokerage — implying that investors could somehow achieve their long-term goals by engaging in short-term behavior.”
By using technology to turn investing into a video game — lines snaking up and down a glowing screen, arrows pulsating in garish hues of red and green — the online brokerages were tapping into fundamental forces at work in the human brain.”
What are the most popular apps on our “smartphones?” 
Video games and social media.
Why, because of the “dopamine” our brain releases.
This is why apps like “Robinhood” and “Stash” that allow for online trading straight from our phones have gained in such popularity. The “immediacy effect” of instant feedback on success or failure keeps us clicking for next winner. Wall Street has become a full-blown casino with individuals lining up to pull the lever to see if they are the next big winner. But, just as it is in Las Vegas, the “house usually wins.” 

The Prediction Addiction

Adding to our list of behavioral flaws and biases when it comes to investing, Jason points out another:
“In 1972, Benjamin Graham wrote: ‘The speculative public is incorrigible. In financial terms it cannot count beyond 3.  It will buy anything, at any price, if there seems to be some ‘action’ in progress.’ – Graham, The Intelligent Investor, pp. 436-437.
In a stunning confirmation of his argument, the latest neuroscientific research has shown that Graham was not just metaphorically but literally correct that speculators ‘cannot count beyond 3.’ The human brain is, in fact, hard-wired to work in just this way: pattern recognition and prediction are a biological imperative.
Scott Huettel, a neuropsychologist at Duke University, recently demonstrated that the anterior cingulate, a region in the central frontal area of the brain, automatically anticipates another repetition after a stimulus occurs only twice in a row. In other words, when a stock price rises on two consecutive ticks, an investor’s brain will intuitively expect the next trade to be an uptick as well.
This process — which I have christened ‘the prediction addiction’ — is one of the most basic characteristics of the human condition. Automatic, involuntary, and virtually uncontrollable, it is the underlying neural basis of the old expression, ‘Three’s a trend.’ Years ago, when most individual investors could obtain stock prices only once daily, it took a minimum of three days for the ‘I get it’ effect to kick in. But now, with most websites updating stock prices every 20 seconds, investors readily believed that they had spotted sustainable trends as often as once a minute.”
While individuals regularly proclaim to be “long-term investors,” the average holding period for stocks has shrunk from more than 6-years in the 1970’s to less than 6-months currently.

The Advisor’s Role

These psychological and behavioral issues are exceedingly difficult to control and lead us regularly to making poor investment decisions over time. But this is where the role of an “advisor” should be truly defined and valued.
While the performance chase, a by-product of the very behavioral issues we wish to control, leads everyone to seek out last years “hottest” performing manager or advisor, this is not really the advisor’s main role. The role of an Advisor is NOT beating some random benchmark index or to promote a “buy and hold” strategy. (There is no sense in paying for a model you can do yourself.)
Jason summed it well:
“The only legitimate response of the investment advisory firm, in the face of these facts, is to ensure that it gets no blood on its hands. Asset managers must take a public stand when market valuations go to extremes — warning their clients against excessive enthusiasm at the top and patiently encouraging clients at the bottom.”
Given that individuals are emotional and subject to emotional swings caused by market volatility, the Advisors role is not only to be a portfolio manager, but also a psychologist. Dalbar suggested four successful practices to reduce harmful behaviors:
  1. Set Expectations below Market Indices: Change the threshold at which the fear of failure causes investors to abandon an investment strategy. Set reasonable expectations and do not permit expectations to be inferred from historical records, market indexes, personal experiences or media coverage. The average investor cannot be above average. Investors should understand this fact and not judge the performance of their portfolio based on broad market indices.
  2. Control Exposure to Risk: Include some form of portfolio protection that limits losses during market stresses.
    Explicit, reasonable expectations are best set by agreeing on a goal that consists of a predetermined level of risk and expected return. Keeping the focus on the goal and the probability of its success will divert attention away from frequent fluctuations that lead to imprudent actions
  3. Monitor Risk Tolerance: Periodically reevaluate investor’s tolerance for risk, recognizing that the tolerance depends on the prevailing circumstances and that these circumstances are subject to change.
    Even when presented as alternatives, investors intuitively seek both capital preservation and capital appreciation. Risk tolerance is the proper alignment of an investor’s need for preservation and desire for capital appreciation. Determination of risk tolerance is highly complex and is not rational, homogenous nor stable.
  4. Present forecasts in terms of probabilities: Simply stating that past performance is not predictive creates a reluctance to embark on an investment program.
    Provide credible information by specifying probabilities or ranges that create the necessary sense of caution without negative effects. Measuring progress based on a statistical probability enables the investor to make a rational choice among investments based on the probability of reward.
The challenge, of course, it understanding that the next major impact event, market reversion, will NOT HAVE the identical characteristics of the previous events. This is why comparing today’s market to that of 2000 or 2007 is pointless. Only the outcome will be the same.
One thing that all the negative behaviors have in common is that they can lead investors to deviate from a sound investment strategy that was narrowly tailored towards their goals, risk tolerance, and time horizon.
The best way to ward off the aforementioned negative behaviors is to employ a strategy that focuses on one’s goals and is not reactive to short-term market conditions. The data shows that the average mutual fund investor has not stayed invested for a long enough period of time to reap the rewards that the market can offer more disciplined investors. The data also shows that when investors react, they generally make the wrong decision.
The reality is that the majority of advisors are ill-prepared for an impact event to occur. This is particularly the case in late-stage bull market cycles where complacency runs high.
When the impact event occurs, advisors who are prepared to handle responses, provide clear messaging, and an action plan for both conserving investment capital and eventual recovery will find success in obtaining new clients.
The discussion of why “this time is not like the last time” is largely irrelevant. Whatever gains that investors garner in the between now and the next impact event by chasing the “bullish thesis” will be largely wiped away in a swift and brutal downdraft. Of course, this is the sad history of individual investors in the financial markets as they are always “told to buy” but never “when to sell.”
You can do better.