9 dicembre forconi: unsustainable debt
Visualizzazione post con etichetta unsustainable debt. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta unsustainable debt. Mostra tutti i post

martedì 4 settembre 2018

Where Will The Next Crisis Come From?

Key Points
  • It’s been 10 years since a U.S. financial shock turned into a crisis in the global financial, market and economic system.
  • A shock turns into a crisis when the system is unprepared for it. The system is often at its most vulnerable near the end of the global economic cycle when excesses have built up and managing risks may have been neglected.
  • The global economic, financial and market system now seems better prepared to manage the shocks of the past were they to repeat in the future. But there are other increased vulnerabilities including: high debt levels, political fragmentation, dependence on international sales, little fiscal or monetary policy ammunition, and the rise of passive investments.
It’s been 10 years since a U.S. financial shock turned into a crisis in the global financial, market and economic system. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy as the shock waves from subprime mortgages rocked the entire financial system, shattering confidence and leading to an economic downfall.
Regularly paying attention to financial news reveals one thing for certain: shocks to the global system happen all the time. Many of these shocks are absorbed by the system without much disruption. Recent examples of shocks might include last year’s escalating geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, the U.S. Fed beginning to reverse QE (quantitative easing), or the rapid unwinding of the short-volatility trade that took place earlier this year. 
A shock turns into a crisis when the system is unprepared for it. The system is often at its most vulnerable near the end of the global economic cycle when excesses have built up and managing risks may have been neglected. Since we have likely reached the later stages of the cycle, it is now a good time to assess how well the system is prepared for the shocks that lie ahead and where the biggest vulnerabilities may lie.
Hundreds of shocks turned into relatively few crises that hit stocks
Source: Charles Schwab, Bloomberg data as of 8/16/2018.

Better prepared for some shocks

The global economic, financial and market system now seems better prepared to manage the shocks of the past were they to repeat in the future thanks to: stable energy supplies, low inflation, “circuit breakers”, few fixed exchange rates, a lack of extreme valuations, lots of corporate cash, and stronger banks.
1.  Stable energy supplies – A frequent source of shocks that the system has been vulnerable to in the past has been abrupt shifts in the supply of oil: the Arab oil embargo in 1973, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the U.S. shale oil boom in 2014-15. Each of these lead to very big moves in the price of oil, up or down. Fortunately, today’s increased economic efficiency with regard to oil, as you can see in the chart below, and the growth in non-OPEC supply (notably from the U.S.) would likely have limited the vulnerability of the system to the shocks in 1973 and 1990. 
Oil consumption relative to GDP continues to decline
Source: Charles Schwab, World Bank data as of 8/19/2018.
2.  Low inflation – Inflation remains low and well-contained on a global basis. Markets reflect a high degree of confidence in central banks to stay ahead of the curve on inflation based on inflation forecasts embedded in bond yields and economists’ forecasts. This marks a stark contrast to soaring inflation among many countries in the 1970s as central banks got behind the curve on inflation. This forced an abrupt shock on a vulnerable global system as the Federal Reserve aggressively hiked rates into the double-digits in 1979-80 to end the cycle of spiraling inflation at the cost of a global bear market and recession.
Inflation (CPI year-over-year % change) for selected countries
Source: Charles Schwab, Bloomberg data as of 8/19/2018.
3.  Circuit breakers – The so-called “circuit breakers” would have made the stock market less vulnerable to the selling forces that drove the October 19, 1987 stock market crash where the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 508 points, or 22.6%, the biggest one-day decline in the history of the stock market. A similar one-day drop in the Dow today would be almost 6,000 points. 
Then, an options technique referred to as “portfolio insurance,” which hedges a portfolio of stocks by short selling stock index futures, depended on the ability to sell more as the market declined. This allowed the drop to feed on itself and overwhelm the trading systems. To avoid such selling pressure in the future, circuit breakers were implemented in 1989 across all exchanges which halt trading for periods of time when the stock market hits certain percentage declines. The periodic “flash crashes” we have seen since then have been reserved to very short intra-day moves.
4.  Few fixed exchange rates – The fixed exchange rate regimes that fed the 1998 Asian crisis have all but completely vanished. A major difference between the Asian crisis of 1998 and today is that most emerging markets (EMs) have floating rather than fixed exchange rates, limiting a vulnerability to shocks. Floating exchange rates mean that shocks can be absorbed over time instead of hitting suddenly when multiple currencies devalue by a large amount all at once as we saw in Asia during the fall of 1998. Also, EM current accounts are now in balance, on average, rather than in deficit as they were in 1997-98 when they were dependent upon foreign lending to sustain their trade deficits, as you can see in the chart below. Finally, EMs have much greater foreign currency reserves that can be used to defend their currencies than they did 20 years ago. 
Current accounts in balance
Nine crisis-prone countries included in average: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.

Source: Charles Schwab, International Monetary Fund data as of 8/19/2018.

5.  Valuations not at extremes – There are many measures of stock market valuations. On balance, those valuations are above average, as is typical after an extended period of growth, but not at extremes or as broadly above average as they were in 2000. Extreme valuations make the market vulnerable to a shock in the form of missing lofty expectations. Both the higher level of valuations and the number of industries that had extreme valuations in 2000 compared to today can be seen in the chart below. The economic vulnerability to the 2000 shock was increased by how much investment had poured into intangible goodwill as opposed to productive assets as the valuation bubble inflated.
Valuation comparison by industry: March 2000 peak and July 2018
Price-to-earnings ratio on next twelve months earnings estimates for each of the 66 industry groups that make up the MSCI AC World Index for March 2000 and July 2018. The two industry groups with PEs exceeding 100 appear at top of scale.

Source: Charles Schwab, Factset data as of 8/18/2018.

6.  Lots of corporate cash – Companies have lots of cash relative to history according to data compiled by Bloomberg. This lack of a vulnerability, in our view, that in the past has led to the need for forced sales of assets to support companies’ core businesses may help keep a shock from developing into a crisis. It also suggests the potential for corporate share buybacks that might limit the vulnerability of stock prices to investor selling pressure.
7.  Stronger banks – In our opinion, banks are less vulnerable today than they were ahead of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the 2012 European debt crisis. Most importantly, there has been a reduction in risky activities, including sub-prime mortgage lending. There have also been substantial regulatory and institutional changes which aim to address some of the systemic weaknesses that contributed to the global financial crisis, these include: the establishment of new regulatory institutions, bank stress tests and increased capital requirements, bank taxes and fees, “bail-in” provisions, increased savings protection, and altered incentive structures. There is further progress to be made, especially in Europe where the banking system is still not integrated. But it’s clear that on measurable benchmarks banks are much better prepared. For example, banks are much better capitalized than in 2008-09 and 2011-12 crises with Tier 1 capital ratios considerably higher than they were going into past crises, as you can see in the chart below. 
Domestic banks Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
Source: Charles Schwab, Bloomberg data as of 8/15/2018.

Increased vulnerability to other shocks

The global economic, financial and market system now seems better prepared to manage the shocks of the past were they to repeat in the future. But there are other increased vulnerabilities that may make future shocks turn into a crisis: 
  1. High debt levels could magnify a shock from higher interest rates.
  2. Political fragmentation may impair an effective response to a shock.
  3. Dependence on international sales may mean more vulnerability to a shock from trade conflict.
  4. Little ammunition left in the form of monetary and fiscal stimulus may limit the ability of policy to mitigate a shock from an economic slowdown.
  5. Rising inflows into passive investments might amplify the market volatility from a shock.
Let’s look at each of these vulnerabilities.
1.  High debt levels – Global debt has swelled to 225% of GDP reaching $164 trillion, nearly $50 trillion above the levels that preceded the financial crisis (data is for 2016—the latest year for which totals from the IMF are available). Debt has grown sharply from $62 trillion in 2001 and $116 trillion in 2007 just ahead of the global financial crisis, as you can see in the chart below. 
Global debt has nearly tripled since 2001
Source: Charles Schwab, International Monetary Fund data as of April 2018.
While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts the U.S. as the only advanced economy that will see a further increase in debt-to-GDP ratio over the next five years, as you can see in the chart below, more than one-third of developed economies have debt-to-GDP levels above 85%--three times worse than in 2000. 
IMF expects debt-to-GDP to worsen for the U.S.
Source: Charles Schwab, International Monetary Fund projections as of 4/23/2018.
While a high debt burden isn’t necessarily a problem by itself, it increases the vulnerability of the system to a shock—in particular, a shock that would lift interest rates. Central banks’ QE (quantitative easing) programs helped ease the cost of higher debt burdens by keeping interest rates low, but those programs are winding down. 
In theory, all that debt means the potential losses from a rise in interest rates would be more costly than in the past, especially combined with a stronger dollar pushing up the cost of dollar-denominated debt outside the United States. In reality, it is hard to draw hard conclusions as to what impact an interest rate shock would have on the increasingly indebted global economic and financial system due in part to some of that increase in debt being held by central banks that aren’t leveraged or marked to market on their holdings and refund excess interest payments back to the government, unlike traditional financial institutions. For example, U.S. Treasury yields jumped by about one full percentage point and the dollar soared during 2013’s so-called “taper tantrum” without the shock turning into a crisis. Nevertheless, increasingly high debt burdens represent an increased vulnerability to a shock.
2.  Political fragmentation - The political establishment has frayed considerably in almost all major economies since the global financial crisis. Populism of both the far right and far left has been on the rise making decision-making, and even assembling governments, harder to do. The U.S. appears to be stepping back from its post-WWII role as a stabilizing force and organizer of global crisis responses. The result may be that the willingness or ability of governments to mount an effective response to a shock is impaired and could lead to a crisis. 
3.  Dependence on international trade – After a steady rise over many decades, more than half of the sales of the companies that make up the world’s stock market (MSCI World Index) now come from outside their home country, according to Factset data.  Even domestic sales are impacted by increasingly interconnected global supply chains resulting in greater vulnerability to shocks from bottlenecks or border issues than in the past.
Companies in most countries get most of their sales from outside their borders
Based on sales of companies in MSCI China Index, MSCI India Index, MSCI USA Index, MSCI Australia Index, MSCI Japan Index, MSCI Canada Index, MSCI Korea Index, MSCI Hong Kong Index, MSCI Taiwan Index, MSCI Switzerland Index, MSCI United Kingdom Index, MSCI France Index, MSCI Germany Index, MSCI Netherlands Index. 

Source: Charles Schwab, Factset data as of 8/19/2018.

4.  Less ammunition to fight a downturn - There is little room for governments to use increases in public spending or central banks to ease monetary policy in response to a shock in order to fight an economic downturn. The pre-crisis 2007 U.S. budget deficit of $161 billion, or 1.1% of GDP, pales in comparison to this year’s projection of $804 billion, or 4.5% of GDP. In Europe, with the exception of Germany, there is very little room for governments to engage in fiscal stimulus. Quantitative easing has left central bank balance sheets stuffed with nearly $15 trillion in assets (see chart below) and interest rates are still close to record lows—with policy rates still negative in some countries. 
Central bank balance sheets have bloated since 2008-09 global financial crisis
Source: Charles Schwab, Bloomberg data as of 8/19/2018.
While a downturn that could require as much stimulus as the financial crisis is unlikely, the vulnerability posed by limited ammunition to fight a downturn could lengthen and deepen the effects of the shock.
5.  Rise of passive investing – It is unknown if the rise of passive investing presents a vulnerability to the system, but there is no doubt it represents a change. By extrapolating the trend in passive investing, Moody’s Investor Service forecasts passively invested assets to exceed those actively invested by the end of 2021. 
Passive may exceed 50% market share by 2021
Source: Moody’s Investors Service Calculations for base case forecast dated 2/2/2017 available here: http://www.n3d.eu/_medias/n3d/files/PBC_1057026.pdf
Passive investing is a strategy typically implemented by holding securities in line with their representation in an index, offering a diversified and low-fee portfolio. However, some fear that the mechanical investment rules of passive investing may give rise to distortions in the pricing of individual securities and might reduce diversification while amplifying investors’ trading patterns on the overall market.

Different vulnerabilities may mean different risks

Market watchers tend to look for the signs that in the past signaled a shock was developing into a crisis. Yet, there are some reasons to think that the probability of a repeat of a past crisis or something similar has eased. The changes we have seen should help reduce the vulnerability of the global system to shocks like those of the past. 
Of course, risk has not been entirely eliminated from the system. Vulnerabilities have shifted which may make the shocks that pose the greatest risk of a crisis somewhat different than those of the past. Of these, the potential risk posed by a shock from higher interest rates coupled with a stronger U.S. dollar may pose the greatest threat to a vulnerable financial and economic system.

martedì 26 giugno 2018

America’s Debt Dependence Makes It An Easy Economic Target

“There is a classic denial tactic that many people use when confronted with negative facts about a subject they have a personal attachment to…”
There is a classic denial tactic that many people use when confronted with negative facts about a subject they have a personal attachment to; I would call it “deferral denial” — or a psychological postponing of reality.
For example, point out the fundamentals on the U.S. economy such as the fact that unemployment is not below 4% as official numbers suggest, but actually closer to 20% when you factor in U-6 measurements including the record 96 million people not counted because they have run out of unemployment benefits. Or point out that true consumer inflation in the U.S. is not around 3% as the Federal Reserve and the Bureau of Labor Statistics claims, but closer to 10% according to the way CPI used to be calculated before the government started rigging the numbers.  For a large part of the public including a lot of economic analysts, there is perhaps a momentary acceptance of the danger, but then an immediate deferral — “Well, maybe things will get worse down the road, 10 or 20 years from now, but it’s not that bad today…”
This is cognitive dissonance at its finest. The economy is in steep decline now, but the mind in denial says “it could be worse,” and this is how you get entire populations caught completely off guard by a financial crash. They could have easily seen the signs, but they desperately wanted to believe that all bad things happen in some illusory future, not today.
There is also another denial tactic I see often in the world of politics and economics, which is what I call “paying it backward.” This is what people do when they have a biased attachment to a person or institution and refuse to see the terrible implications of their actions. For example, when we point out that someone like Donald Trump makes destructive decisions, such as the continued support of Israel and Saudi Arabia in Syria and Yemen, or the reinstatement of funding for the White Helmets in Syria who are tied to ISIS, Trump supporters will often say “Well what about Obama?”
This is a game of shifting accountability. Is one person worse than the other? Possibly. I say give it time and make notes. However, the negative decisions of one politician we don’t like do not diminish the negative decisions of another politician we might like. They should BOTH be held accountable.
The same goes for countries and economies. When an analyst points out that U.S. debt is at historic highs and is utterly unsustainable, people in denial will say “but what about China or Europe?” One does not negate the other and, of course, there are differences that make the situation in the U.S. far more tenuous.
Primarily I am talking about America’s endless dependency on the world reserve status of the U.S. dollar and, beyond that, the steady expansion of debt at low interest rates for the past decade.
The Federal Reserve, once the No. 1 buyer of U.S. debt, has essentially declared it is cutting off support and has begun dumping assets from its balance sheet. The only assets the Fed seems to be maintaining are Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). All others are being cut, including Treasuries. The American economy is inexorably attached to the idea of our Treasury debt as a safe investment, with our national debt spiking above $21 trillion and many trillions more owed to entitlement programs depending on how you calculate the expenditures, there is a vital need for steady foreign investment in U.S. debt.
But what happens when investment in U.S. debt becomes politically unsavory? Consider the current escalation of the trade war; Many pro-dollar talking heads and cheerleaders have argued in the past that no nation has the guts to dump dollar denominated assets and risk the wrath of American “economic might.” But, already we have seen Russia dump half its U.S. Treasury holdings in a single month and the trade war has only just begun.
Is Russia’s action a sign of things to come? Will other nations like China follow the same strategy? We will have to wait and see, but I believe this is the inevitable outcome of the trade war if it drags on for the rest of the year.
America’s dependent nature, feeding off of foreign investment to support its debts, is a disaster waiting to happen. The concept of economic “recovery” is laughable until this issue is addressed.  And, entering into a trade war while ignoring this blaring weakness is foolish, to say the least.
Beyond the issue of government (taxpayer) debt, let’s not forget about American corporations and consumers. U.S. corporate debt as a percentage of gross domestic product is at historic highs not seen since the housing bubble of 2008 or the dot-com bubble of 2001. There is a distinct difference, though, that makes today’s bubble far more insidious. After years of near-zero interest rates, corporations have become addicted to cheap debt. So much so that they have been borrowing nonstop to support their own stock prices through stock buyback manipulation. But now the Fed is raising interest rates and has committed to expanded hikes in the future.
So, what will corporations do as the cheap debt dries up? Thus far, they are spending the majority of their Trump tax cut still trying to artificially prop up stock process. When this money runs out (and I believe it will much faster than the mainstream thinks), the existing debt of these companies will cost much more to finance, and future borrowing at the same pace will become impossible. This is a threat that is developing now, not in some far-off future.
Eventually, corporations will have to make deep spending cuts rather than borrow. This means mass layoffs, store closures and potential cuts to pensions. And, of course, no more stock buybacks, meaning a market crash will ensue.
What about the U.S. consumer? U.S. consumer debt is set to reach new highs by the end of the year; around $4 trillion by official estimates.  While discussion continues about the alleged “labor shortage” in the U.S., one thing is clear — the jobs that do exist do NOT pay wages that keep up with true inflation. When we see spikes in retail sales in the U.S. and this is applauded as economy recovery, very few mainstream analysts point out that higher retail sales are merely tracking higher inflation.
That is to say, consumers are spending more money on less stuff. Again, this is unsustainable, which is why consumer debt is exploding. Dependency on credit cards and loans is being used by the public to offset much higher costs. But as the Fed raises interest rates, this too will end. Higher Fed rates translate to higher credit rates as well as higher mortgage rates (indirectly). With higher interest payments comes a large drop in overall spending.
As you can see, there are at least two forces at work here that will end all talk of U.S. recovery and which undermine any notion of economic strength — the first is the trade war, which I believe is a massive distraction designed to draw attention away from the actions of international banks and central banks. The second is the Federal Reserve, which has addicted the country to cheap fiat and is now flushing the drugs. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking that this trend will remain slow or that it will not develop into a crash in the near term. We also cannot simply deflect to other countries like China or those in Europe as if their problems are somehow worse and therefore ours are not a concern.
The fact that the health of the US economy is inexorably reliant on the continued foreign demand for the dollar and Treasury debt means any reduction of the dollar’s world reserve status or petro-status, or any decline in treasury purchases, will directly affect the carefully crafted image of America as a stable system.  Without a sudden and aggressive resurgence of domestic production and innovation America has no safety net in the event that our debt addiction is used against us.
The argument that the central bank can jump in at any time to monetize that debt and reduce the danger is also delusional.  This assumes first and foremost that the Fed WANTS to reduce the danger.  I believe they want the danger to increase, not decrease.  Debt monetization also has the added bonus of causing even more inflation as foreign investors dump their dollar denominated assets back into the US.  Monetization is a poison, not a cure.
The crisis is here, now. Seeing and accepting it allows us to prepare accordingly. Denying it as inconsequential sets people up as victims of their own bias and ignorance.